

Marine Corps Gazette

MAY 1956

FORTY CENTS



MARINE AVIATION

FORTY-FOURTH ANNIVERSARY


Marine Corps Gazette

MAY 1956
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COVER



We salute Marine Corps Aviation on its forty-fourth Anniversary! From the pioneers who flew in the early days when each flight was an adventure, to those today whose highly-developed technical skills enable them to maintain and fly the sleek jet jobs like the A4Ds on our cover, they are the airborne pride of their brothers on the ground. Their abilities and courage enable the Corps to maintain a potent air-ground team, so vital to fulfilling its function as a force-in-readiness.

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message center

13-Man Squad Drill

... I have a timely subject ... the "13-man squad drill." The Marine Corps is seriously thinking of adopting a new drill which is a mixture of every drill known to man and also some things just thought up. It is enough to give any and every man in the Marine Corps nightmares for the rest of his life. The reason for the drill is so that the FMF units can use it as well as garrison troops. Heaven help all hands concerned—especially the company gunnery sergeants and platoon sergeants if this drill is adopted. We know time is precious, as it is, trying to teach tactical movements and all the things needed in an FMF unit, but with this drill it will be even more so because the drill is a full-time job in itself. Let's keep in mind that when this drill was originated and written, everything was done under perfect conditions which meant having 13 men at all times. When do we have full 13-men squads? With working parties, sick-call and other duties that drain our men daily, we are lucky to average half that many. What of Weapons Company with a different T/O—is it to be ignored? What about attached units? Will this drill really work?

When the instructors and drill instructors here at PI first heard of the 13-man drill, we were willing to accept and try anything, because we were under the impression that it would do away with all other drills and be boiled down to one drill only. But let's look this new thing over carefully: It has two separate and distinct drills called Close Interval and Normal Interval Drill.

For the entire Marine Corps' sake, let's give this drill all due consideration before we do adopt it. Try and test it, by all means, but confine it to an actual infantry company or battalion for the test instead of testing it on such a large scale as the whole Marine Corps.

TSgt BILLY L. LYDAY

PI, SC

Ed: Unfortunately for Sgt. LYDAY, the Marine Corps has already adopted the "13 man squad drill." (See In Brief.)

This drill has taken the best aspects of both present drill systems, and therefore is not a nightmare, but actually the cream of the crop. It offers spice and variety to the old, dull, drill period and



is an excellent opportunity for small unit leaders to exercise command responsibilities. Organizations who tested the drill, state that it can be accomplished in the time allotted for drill instruction at the Recruit Depots. Certainly, it was tested under the best personnel conditions, however the drill is designed for use when the strength of the squad is from 8-13 men. There are some new terms, but in such number, (approximately 5) that they shouldn't be too difficult to learn.

Because this is the second drill to confront us in the past few years, it might cause some initial confusion, but we believe it is our job as Marines to accept it with enthusiasm and give it a fighting chance. . . . It has the promise of being better than both present systems.

BAR Comment by SLAM

... I have read *Hail to the BARman!* in your March issue, and quite apart from the comment on my estimates of the weapon, I would say a loud *amen* to his general conclusions.

The use of the BAR during 1st Mar Div's operation in the North was a conspicuous example of how rifle fire is rallied and concentrated around the action of this weapon. In fact, it was after I had concluded the study of how your fire teams produced unity of group fire around the BARmen during the Reservoir operation that I recommended the adoption of the fire team

organization within the squad to the Eighth Army. It was less clear that there was any direct and tactically flexible advantage to the larger squad you were using over the 2-fire team squad that came to be accepted within the infantry divisions. I would like to see this argued by someone who has had combat experience in leading squads of both sizes, with emphasis put on the control problem in the taking of ground under varying conditions.

One point which Capt Davis did not mention, and which I felt of main importance in Korean action is that, whereas rifle fire by itself has relatively little deterring effect on the will and forward movement of enemy groups at ranges in excess of 300-350 yards; when BAR fire is added to the rifle volume, then the combined weapons have stopping, if not turning, power. This I saw demonstrated repeatedly. Probably the best explanation lies in the fact that the automatic fire gives real body to the bullet swarm, in addition to the fact that it invigorates all rifle activity.

Above and beyond these considerations, Korea convinced me that for maximum punch, plus staying ability, the squad must have a combination of rapid and slow-fire weapons. Retention of ammunition to the point of high crisis in small unit engagement is a besetting problem, particularly among green troops during night engagement.

In last analysis, we won many times because the M1 had husbanded the last shock after the automatic weapons had gone dry. I cannot imagine a more hazardous experiment than the substituting of full-automatic weapons for rifles all along the line.

S. L. A. MARSHALL

Detroit News, Detroit, Mich.

Old Pros

... MSgt Snodgrass' letter in the March GAZETTE points up a thorny issue which has mystified me to some degree ever since the publication of the first Sergeant Major/First Sergeant selections.

Apparently, and judging from those selected who were known to me, the board and the Commandant were interested in those Marines of the prescribed ranks and with the skills required who had a few years' service remaining before becoming eligible for retirement.

This is an admirable goal when considered separately from other ramifications but, as MSgt Snodgrass said, *What happens now to the old pros?* From personal observation I know of two MSgts (both now holding MOS 0141) who held previous warrants as Sergeants Major, one in 1943, one in 1945—both applied for designation, neither was selected.

I do not intend this letter as any sort

Telephone Man Helps Save Five from Tidal Waters

**Quick action prevents
tragedy when family
is marooned in hurricane**

Hurricane winds of 110 miles an hour were creating a tidal wave when the telephone operator at Block Island, Rhode Island, received a call for help from a family marooned in a cottage.

"I was in the telephone office," says installer repairman Robert A. Gillespie, "when I heard of the call. I'd been through hurricanes before and I knew they might be in real trouble."

Quickly enlisting the aid of two men who were outside the telephone building, he drove his company truck to within 400 feet of the isolated



RESCUE AT HAND. Telephone man fights his way through swirling waters to bring marooned cottagers to safety during hurricane.



AWARDED MEDAL—Robert A. Gillespie, of Block Island, R. I., was awarded the Vail Medal for "courage, endurance and ingenuity" in helping to rescue five people marooned by tidal waters. Vail Medals, accompanied by cash awards, are given annually by the Bell System for acts of noteworthy public service by telephone employees.

cottage, as near as the high water would allow.

"We could see that three poles led toward the cottage," says Bob Gillespie, "so we took handlines and a rope from the truck. We secured one end of the line to the first pole and waded to the second pole. There we tied up our line and kept wading to the third pole."

But they were still thirty feet away from the marooned family when they got as far as the rope would go—thirty feet of dangerous, rushing water.

Bob Gillespie's companions safeguarded the ropes while he fought his way alone to the cottage.

He made three trips through the rising tidal waters. First he carried a small boy to the comparative safety of the forward end of the rope.

Then, with considerable difficulty, assisted two women; and a man and another boy. And finally, though almost exhausted, he guided the entire group along the all-important rope lifeline that led to high ground and safety.

HELPING HANDS—The spirit of service of telephone men and women is shown not only in the dramatic situations of fire and flood and storm, but in the everyday affairs of life. Thousands of times every day, and through the long hours of the night, the telephone and telephone people help those who are ill or in trouble or confronted by some occasion that needs a skilled and willing hand. Just having the telephone close by gives a feeling of security and of being close to people.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



of belittlement of those fine Marines who were selected. I do, however, agree with Sergeant Snodgrass that some of the professionals have been forgotten.

CAPT W. E. CLEMENS
Clarksville, Tenn.

... MSgt Snodgrass's lament touched me so deeply that, for the first time in my career as a Marine, I take recourse with another man's weapon — the pen.

I take exception to the words *Poor Professional First Sergeant and Sergeant Major*. Assuming the writer became a *Professional Sergeant Major* because of his leadership in the field, and not because of his super ability at shuffling paper or running a mimeograph machine, a lament such as his reflects a certain amount of *Leadership potential; lack of*.

It was my understanding at the inception of this program that the main reason for selection of 1stSgts/SgtsMaj was to put a man who *knew* his organization in charge of his organization. A round peg in a round hole, so to speak. Administrative personnel, who may or may not have adapted themselves to different types of organizations, have in the past devoted themselves entirely to paperwork. An efficiently functioning outfit needs more than a good paper

shuffler. It needs a man who can supervise formations, allocate work, etc. In general, a man who can devote his time to the organization as a whole and know how his people tick.

I know very few *Professional SgtsMaj* who can supervise a formation or who can hold school on anything other than paper work. In the past, the big wheel at the desk has always been excused from everything. Consequently, other men have gone to Leadership Schools, made maneuvers, held training and done the work that a SgtMaj should do. Face facts, and you'll realize this is true.

You can retrain and be designated, if you have the initiative necessary to be a 1stSgt/SgtMaj in the first place. Or you can sit back and be the Administrative NCO of your outfit. The choice is yours and the outcome won't be decided by tears in your beer such as *Lo the Poor Indian*.

SGTMaj EDWARD D. PERLSEN
El Toro, Calif.

Promotion, Prestige, etc. Amen!

... Much has been done to get the man to join the service but little has been done to keep him in. . . .

... Emphasis should lay on the career man . . . he should be tested every 3 years to keep him on his toes, and if

he should fail the test, make way for the man who is qualified. This eliminates the dead wood and inspires the men who are ambitious.

... The career man should be given priority over other men for selection in promotion and more thought must be given to the family man. . .


... Send the E-4 pay grade to Staff NCO School and the E-5, 6, 7 pay grades to Officer Candidate School so that in time of emergency they can get a temporary commission. It would be something to work for.

SSGT N. J. Craft
MARTD, S. Weymouth, Mass

... It seems to me that too many NCOs today are hiding behind the UCMJ. They try to bend the will of a recalcitrant man and can't, so they resort to the old "run-'em-and-disc-'em" routine. A dime for every time I've heard, "Do it or I'll take you to see the man," would make me rich. . .

... If a man knows the NCO respects him as an individual, then there is a basis for the return of that respect. That, I think, is the first step to regaining any lost prestige and those privileges we all moan about losing.

SGT SAM VANDIVER
Miami, Fla.



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... I am not an "Old Salt" but I am a Staff NCO in the Marine Corps. I was lucky enough to make my rank in 5 years but I worked hard for each step.

... SSgt Towe does not think that Marines make enough money for the Corps to be a worthwhile career. Perhaps he has forgotten the Marine Corps does not establish the amount of pay a serviceman will receive.

... On the other hand, I am now making more money than my father ever did in his life. He raised 6 children on his salary and sent all of us to school. I can't ever remember going hungry during that period.

SSGT B. B. CHAPMAN

Luzon, PI

... Let's start treating our Staff NCOs like leaders and then sit back and watch them act like leaders. In brief:

1) Arm the platoon sergeant with the same weapon the platoon leader is armed with.

2) Make it a practice not to use the platoon sergeant as just another body for reviews and parades. Use him in his proper place.

3) Do not require uniformed Staff NCOs to show liberty cards to sentries.

4) Let all Staff NCOs be exempt from laying out clothing (except for IG).

5) Have separate living quarters for the staff rates so they won't have to live with lower ranks.

MSGT A. V. SCHIPKE

1st MAW

... I will be glad to lay out my clothing in Times Square at 1600 on any specified day but I don't think we should exhibit our dirty linen in public. Therefore I don't think the things Capt R. B. Wilson wrote about should be discussed in the pages of the GAZETTE. Letters of that type create an unfavorable impression.

TSgt L. J. BRITT

Boston, Mass

ED: *In view of space limitations it was necessary to edit the letters above and cut them to include only pertinent points. The editors concur with the sentiments expressed by TSgt L. J. Britt ... bury the subject ... at least for this fiscal year.*

Technically, Not Correct

... Is it correct to call all Technical Sergeants *Gunny*? Most of the men in the Marine Corps today came in since

the rank of Gunnery Sergeant was abolished. In fact, a large percentage of them came into the Marine Corps since 1950. By that time, the distinction in types of chevrons had been abolished.

When the rank of Gunnery Sergeant was in effect, he wore a chevron which had two crossed rifles in the center, with a bursting bomb. This type of chevron was worn until around 1940 when the supply was exhausted. Then he wore chevrons with two rockers.

His counterparts in pay grade were called technical sergeants, denoting that they were in a specialty field. Those in Supply had the rank and title Supply Sergeant. At one time, their chevrons were distinctive and had a small wheel in the center. The bottom of their chevrons was flat.

Those in the Mess branch wore that type of chevron and at one time wore a crescent in the center. The crescent was faced in one direction for a Mess Sergeant and the opposite way for a Baker.

In addition, there were distinguishing ranks and chevrons for personnel in the Band, Paymaster and Communication sections to mention but a few.

During the years between World War II and the Korean conflict it was decided to do away with these many titles so that it would be easier on the Muster Roll. There was one title only for each pay grade, as we have today.

The result of all this was that the name Gunnery Sergeant became only a title or description of duties in infantry, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery and ship's detachments.

Technical Sergeants should therefore be addressed as *Sergeant Axehandle*. If he is currently filling the billet as a Gunnery Sergeant, he might then be called a *Gunny*.

TSgt JOHN P. O'TOOLE

PI, SC

Guerrilla Value

... The article on *Guerrilla Warfare* (March GAZETTE) contains the statement that even before the American re-invasion of the Philippines the Japanese needed 10 combat battalions for rear area security against Filipino guerrillas. Shortly after the war I interviewed Lt-Gen Shigenori Kuroda, Japanese commander in the Philippines until just before the Leyte campaign. He told me he had estimated that, once the Americans landed, he would need about 50 battalions to control the guerrillas. Kuroda felt that before such a landing the guerrillas, despite their activity, had hardly more than a nuisance value. But he agreed that once an invasion began he would have had quite a bit of trouble from them.

Since Gen Kuroda's estimate meant



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that about 50,000 badly needed Japanese combat troops would have to be withdrawn from the line to combat guerrillas, the value of well-organized partisan forces operating behind enemy lines can easily be seen.

CAPT STANLEY L. FALK, USAR
Arlington, Va.

Inequities

...CMC letter A01-kb of 14 December 1955 established quotas for assignment of enlisted Reservists to unrestricted extended active duty.

This authority also makes it possible to enlist a man in the Reserves who has one dependent including a wife. I want to take the opportunity to state what I think is wrong with this program and how it might be improved.

A raw civilian has the opportunity to enlist in the Marine Corps even though he has one dependent. BUT ex-Marines are being turned away every day at Recruiting Stations because they are married and do not have the qualifications to be reappointed to the rank of sergeant or above. The Marine Corps is turning away trained men who could be re-enlisted and be an asset to the Corps. These men, given the opportunity to re-enlist, would make better Marines because they have an obligation to their dependent to make good.

I feel that it is unfortunate that we must turn away ex-Marines who have a dependent, yet may enlist a man who has no prior service and has a dependent. In this day and age trained men are at a premium; they could be re-enlisted immediately if minor changes were made in existing regulations.

In the event of a National Emergency these same men, regardless of the fact that they have a dependent, would be recalled to active duty.

1STSGT LOUIS SANDORELLO
Phila., Pa.


On Judo Katas

... Thank you for sending me a copy of the review by SSgt Mok on my book *Judo Katas*.

The entire review seems a left-handed compliment by someone intent on discrediting the author. I say this because of the following errors:

He states that the author of *Judo Katas*, the publishers and Henry Stone are misinformed regarding *Judo Katas* being the first book in English dealing with this phase of Judo, further stating that Kodansha of Japan published such a book. For the information of those interested, the Kodansha book bears a copyright date as of 1955, and at the time *Judo Katas* was in the works there was nothing definite on the Kodansha book except rumors.

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Further, Sgt Mok states that the author of *Judo Katas* fails to amplify certain highly stylized ceremonial aspects of *Kata*. This interested me, because I had done considerable research on *Kata* before preparing my book and have had pointers given me by high-ranking Japanese players, so I picked up the Kodan-sha book (which, by the way, is *not* available in the United States except through affiliated Judo activities) and searched for these ceremonial aspects. I could find none.

Further, I am admonished for not warning Judo students regarding the dangers of certain throwing and locking techniques. If reviewer Mok would have taken time to read the text he'd have found what he needed, on pages 78 and 101.

I know Sgt Mok as a Judo player, and I know that this factored in his thinking that he was qualified to review a book on the sport he himself loves and practices. He also has the right to recommend a book or not, as he sees fit in his opinion—but ought first to read a book before reviewing it. And he should also bear in mind that no book is going to be presented in exactly the way that he would like to have presented it.

MR. CHARLES YERKOW

Whitestone, LI, NY

Anecdotes Anyone?

... Several years before joining the Corps, my father made me a subscriber to the *GAZETTE*, which I have read faithfully every month. At times it was an effort, but some of your recent issues have been a pleasure to read. I hope that it is indicative of the quality of future issues, and especially that the old timers will heed Maj Saxon's suggestion to submit articles and anecdotes about the characters who made, and are still making, the Marine Corps distinctive.

And along that line I have a suggestion wherein I believe that just about all hands who wanted to take the time could participate in writing a better *GAZETTE*. What do you think about publishing brief, unusual, humorous or pointed (or both) anecdotes about things that happened to you or that you saw happen? An occasional *quickie* would make it more readable and, even more than that, a closer approximation of things that are going on in the Marine Corps. After all, it is a professional magazine, and it is very unprofessional to overlook the humorous and personal incidents which are happening every hour of every day. Furthermore, I have observed that this has been done successfully in other professional magazines.

2DLT J. CHMELIK

Quantico, Va.

... I noted, as did almost all Marines, the passing of Maj Louis N. Cukela. In 6 years of active duty I've heard many interesting and amusing anecdotes concerning this colorful personality. Some of these stories are undoubtedly factual and many are half-truths, near-truths or, if not true, they should have been.

There's not much question that Maj Cukela was one of the great all-time personalities of the Marine Corps. I think it would be a shame if some of the incidents concerning his life and duties were not preserved in writing.

As the *GAZETTE* plays an important informative role in the Marine Corps, and also has the capability of reaching so many people who have the information mentioned above, it would be interesting to see what reader-response you would receive from a request to your readers for short anecdotes on this subject.

CAPT P. F. C. ARMSTRONG
Quantico, Va.

ED: The *GAZETTE* staff heartily concurs with the two Association members whose ideas are published above. Thus, in order to spice our pages with a bit of humor and to perpetuate Marine Corps lore, the *GAZETTE* will pay \$10.00 for each such anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed—200 words or less.

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
Until recently, microwave was limited to line-of-sight distances, signals being beamed directly from one antenna right at another. However, engineers knew that a small part of the signal "drops off" the beam, or is "scattered" in the troposphere. A whole new concept was visualized, requiring new, specially-designed equipment.

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introducing

WE DEPLORE THE FACT THAT LACK of aviation articles made it necessary to go back to a 1950 issue of the GAZETTE and reprint *Marine Aviation, Its Origins and Growth* (page 14). But we need not apologize for the article itself which is as interesting and readable today as it was back in 1950 when **LtCol C. W. Boggs, Jr.**, then serving with the Historical Branch, G3, HQMC, wrote it.

HOWEVER, THE AVIATORS ARE NOT without representation in this anniversary issue. Although **LtCol R. P. Keller's** *Fighting Formations* (page 24) is not an aviation article, per se, it does contain the basic ideal of closer integration of our air-ground organization. He has been flying for the Marine Corps since he was commissioned in 1941. He recently finished a tour at HQMC as Head, Operations and Planning Section of the Plans and Readiness Branch of the Division of Aviation and is now at the Armed Forces Staff College.

Theorum

The virility of the Marine Corps Association is directly proportional to the intellectual curiosity of its members in the field of professional thought. To stimulate such thought, and to permit the Association to present new ideas to its members, thus providing a forum for discussion, is the function of the Association's journal—the Marine Corps GAZETTE. Consequently, it is obligatory to keep the editorial content of the journal abreast of the latest thinking of its members. To this end, a continuing need exists for certain types of articles.

Aviation—Although the multiple tasks of Marine Corps Aviation merit thorough discussion, there has been a critical lack of professionally interesting articles on aviation subjects. Seldom clarified to the ground members of the air-ground team and not always appreciated by our aviators, are the important responsibilities of the Marine Corps in other than direct support aviation. We appeal to aviation members of the Association for their thoughts on such typical subjects as the Marine Corps capability for, and employment of, electronic countermeasures; capabilities of our new FJ4 Furies; integration of our newly developed surface to air missile battalions into the Marine air defense system; a

ANOTHER AVIATOR, **LtCol S. B. Folsom**, whose by-line should be familiar to regular readers, mailed us his article from Oslo, Norway where he is serving as Assistant Naval Attache. His latest contribution, *Realistic Readiness*, appears on page 28.

Master Sergeant C. V. Crumb, (*Energy in Leadership*, page 30), has served the Corps with distinction as an officer and enlisted man for almost 20 years. He was commissioned in 1945 after 8 years of enlisted service and resigned his reserve commission in 1946 to re-enlist. He has had almost every type of Marine Corps duty—recruiting duty, NROTC duty and duty in China both before and after WWII. He has been at an air station, the Depot of Supplies and with most FMF units in the Marine Corps. Now NCO in Charge of Technique of Military Instruction Section and a leadership instructor, 1st Mar Div Schools, he has been a loyal member of the Association and a faithful contributor to the GAZETTE for many years.

THE "MANSTEIN PLAN" HAS BEEN the subject of discussion in several foreign military journals at the same time the GAZETTE published the distinguished

replacement transport for our R4Q and R5D aircraft; the meaning and purpose of our air control system and measures to modernize it. These and a hundred other subjects could find an avid audience in the GAZETTE and greatly influence Marine Corps policy in the years to come. We think that to be truly representative of the Marine Corps as it is today, this should be done. How about it?

Tactics—We always need concrete recommendations to implement, at the lower operational levels, the concepts of the "new warfare" and the three-dimensional amphibious attack; ideas on how to package and organize our small units, up to battalion-squadron level, so as to achieve maximum effect. Perhaps recent FMF maneuvers have generated some thought along these lines.

Members who have any subject in mind and who would like to submit an outline of a proposed article for consideration by the editorial staff to ascertain whether or not there is a need for such material, are encouraged to do so. Completed manuscripts, however, should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced with one-inch margins. Please address all material to the Editorial Offices, Marine Corps GAZETTE, Quantico, Virginia.

German Fieldmarshal's article, *German Operations Planning for the Campaign in the West, 1940* (Nov '55).

The GAZETTE is proud to have been able to present the first account of this plan to be published in this country by the very man who conceived it.

This month, **Fieldmarshal von Manstein** presents his account of the very unusual conditions and circumstances which marked *The Campaign in the Crimea, 1941-42* (p 32). This operation was an exception, in most respects, to the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front. For his generalship in this campaign, the author was promoted to Colonel General in February '42, and to Fieldmarshal after capture of the fortress, Sevastopol.


In the data published in November, on the author, the editorial staff made an error in translating the German numerical designators. Where we noted his command as the Second Army, it should have been the Eleventh Army.

All the photographs not credited to the author were found through research made by the staff in the captured German photo file of the Army Signal Corps and actually depict places and events referred to in the text.

Captain R. M. Erbland who is ExO of the T&E unit at MCS, Quantico where all promotion examinations are prepared and graded, wrote *Preparation for Promotion* (page 52) because he thought it would help leaders who wanted to assist their men to prepare for promotion tests. Since being graduated from the Naval Academy in 1946, Capt Erbland has been an instructor at the NCO School, Camp Lejeune and an administrative aide to the Director, Joint Staff, JCS. He was at the Marine Barracks, Adak, Alaska in 1951 and he came to Quantico in January '54 after serving with the 7th Marines in Korea as CO of "I" Co, and later as a battalion and regimental S4.

Aerial Photography for Ground Forces (page 48) by **1stLt Carl H. Strandberg** is also a subject now being considered by the Marine Corps Development Center. Commissioned in 1947 after enlisted service in WWII, Lt Strandberg is an avid camera fan. He combined his hobby with education when he attended the Photo Interpreter/Photogrammetry Course at Anacostia, DC in 1952. In Korea in 1953-54 he was Asst S3 of 3/7, then Aerial Photo Interpretation Officer, G2, 1st Mar Div. He has been Asst Secretary, MCDC, since March 1955. While at The Development Center, he has been commended on several occasions for projects in research and development which he initiated.

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MARINE AVIATION

its origins and growth

By LtCol C. W. Boggs, Jr.

IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE youth standing, wide-eyed, near his Georgia home had any thoughts of becoming a Marine. He had other thoughts at the moment, though, all completely oblivious of earthly things, as he watched a passenger-carrying balloon ascend to become a tiny dot in the sky. When the basket, suspended from a bulky sack filled with illuminating gas, touched down to earth again, this airminded young man rushed to the spot. Before that afternoon was over, Alfred Austell Cunningham soared aloft twice, and knew for himself the thrill that so few men had experienced. The obsession that would father Marine Corps Aviation had taken permanent root. The year was 1903—the



same in which, at Kitty Hawk, NC, history records man's first sustained flight in a heavier-than-air machine.

In 1903 Al Cunningham was 21 years old, already he was a veteran of one war. At age 16 he mustered into the 2d Georgia Infantry Volunteers as a corporal, and during a one-year tour saw duty in Cuba and in the Spanish-American War. In 1899 he returned to Atlanta to complete his education, and subsequent to the balloon episode, entered the real estate business. Yet 10 years after his discharge from the Army, the maturing Cunningham decided to step back into military harness once again. On 25 January 1909, he accepted a commission as second lieutenant in the Marine Corps at the School of Ap-

Marine Corps Gazette • May 1956

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plication, Parris Island, SC.

The year before Lt Cunningham entered the Corps, the US Navy had first taken official notice of the aeroplane as a possible weapon for use in the Fleet. Two naval officers attended, as observers, a demonstration at Ft Myer, Va. in which Orville Wright carried a passenger in continuous flight for one hour. The report submitted by the Navy representatives was enthusiastic indeed: "The Navy must have that! It will be important to us." But nothing came of it—for the time being.

From most military careerists, in those early days of crude pioneering, aviation suffered stern resistance. The flying machine they regarded as anything but a practical weapon of war; flying was a sport for the

of this persevering officer, Naval Aviation weighed anchor. Though launched in shallow water it headed slowly upstream in that year.

Captain Chambers struggled with an unresponsive Congress, faced an obstructionist attitude from the battleship protagonists, and found it necessary to combat skepticism from the press and the public. But his faith, enthusiasm and personal vigor steered a steady course toward providing wings for the Fleet.

With the co-operation of Glenn Curtiss, who built aeroplanes, and Eugene Ely, who flew them, the "four-striper" was able to convince the skeptics that a plane could take off from the deck of a warship. Mr. Ely flew one of the new-fangled contraptions off a platform built on the

an offer made by Curtiss to teach a naval officer to fly. On 10 December 1910, Lt Theodore G. Ellyson, USN, was ordered to the Curtiss Flying Field at North Island, San Diego, Calif. Ellyson thereby became the first Navy pilot, and when in 1914 an official designation and precedence for naval flyers was adopted, his name entered the records of air history as Naval Aviator Number 1.

In the meantime, 2dLt Cunningham served a "sea-going" apprenticeship aboard the *New Jersey* and the *North Dakota*, went ashore at Guantanamo, Cuba with a Provisional Brigade of Marines and then commanded a leatherneck detachment on the *Lancaster*. By mid-1911 orders to shore-duty found him sta-



daring and foolhardy. As a result of this general apathy, 1910 rolled around before one Capt Washington Irving Chambers, USN, was ordered to the Navy Department to study aviation and its adaptability for naval use. Under the guiding hand

forecastle of the USS *Birmingham* on the morning of 14 November 1910.

While the Navy seemed slightly impressed, it was still cautious, watchful and not a little leery. However, the powers-that-were accepted

tioned at the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia Navy Yard.

He had great reason to enjoy this assignment: promotion and a very special environment that served to awaken a dormant interest. The first of these provided him with a few extra dollars which were soon put to extraordinary use. Philadelphia, in 1911, counted among its populace many aviation enthusiasts, and the Marine officer-came to know everyone actively connected with flying. One of these acquaintances, an inventor named Brown, had built a machine that looked like, and made all the noises of, an aeroplane. But

From its birthday in May 1912, pioneer Marine airmen

flew a bumpy course developing an aviation force-in-readiness

it wouldn't fly. Inasmuch as plane-maker Brown was without funds, plane-lover Cunningham made a deal. For \$25 a month the Lieutenant leased the conglomerate assortment of bamboo poles, haywire and a put-put engine, and set about to pursue the dreams of his youth.

The "Noisy Nan," as she came to be known, was truly a laughable folly of her day. Certainly not a machine which left any enviable record of aerial achievement, she did, nonetheless, leave a name to be immortalized in the annals of Marine Aviation history: as spectacularly unsuccessful as were these exploits, the attendant commotion created by "Nan" and her hopeful "driver" had direct bearing in the conception of our air child.

In spite of unabated joshing, the Marine's enthusiasm for flying never flickered. Though at that point not literally a "flyer," he became an ardent member of the Aero Club of Pennsylvania. When, soon afterward, pressure was brought to bear in Congress by some of the influential clubsters for the creation of a Marine Corps aviation program in Philadelphia, MajGen Commandant William P. Biddle hurriedly summoned Lt Cunningham as being the fount behind the embarrassing pressure.


A friendly call-to-the-carpet it must have been, for the ultimate outcome of the commotion could not have been more to the junior officer's liking. Cunningham was ordered to the Navy's aviation camp which had been set up at Annapolis, Md. in the spring of 1911. The date of his initial arrival at Annapolis—22 May 1912—has been heralded by some as the birth of Marine Aviation.

A handful of pioneers stepped into the picture with faith, prodigious effort and an undaunted anticipation that air would someday become an integral part of their Corps.

Cunningham undertook nothing but ground study at Annapolis in July 1912. The Navy had already purchased two Curtiss planes and the Wright B1, and had a total of 4 officers sufficiently checked out to fly them, but original flight instruction was still given only at an aeroplane factory. In August the newest aviation recruit proceeded to the Burgess and Curtiss plant at Marblehead, Mass. where, after 2 hours and 40 minutes of dual instruction, he soloed a hydroplane to become Marine Corps pilot Number 1, the fifth within the naval service.

While still at Marblehead, Cunningham studied engines, learned how aeroplanes were built and initiated correspondence with Headquarters which resulted in the first orders involving an enlisted Marine in aviation duties. A mechanic, electrician and an apt helper on Noisy Nan, Sgt James Maguire was released temporarily from Philadelphia to learn first-hand the intricacies of aviation mechanics. Maguire joined the pilot at Marblehead on 28 August 1912. While this was not then considered to be a permanent arrangement, it truly established the basic cadre of Marine Aviation personnel. Not until 6 November of the same year did the Sergeant receive actual aviation orders which transferred him to Annapolis "on extra duty as mechanic."

On 18 September 1912, the force of Marine pilots was doubled. 1stLt Bernard L. Smith arrived at the aviation camp to begin an aerial career, one which turned out to be of inesti-



Smith—Marine aviator #2


mable value to the Corps' Aviation. The potential of an air arm in the making was duly noted in the Maj Gen Commandant's 1912 Annual Report to SecNav: "In view of the great benefit to an Advanced Base Force that might result from trained aviators, two officers and one man of the Marine Corps have been under instruction in aviation at the United States Naval Academy."

In late December 1912, the Annapolis camp moved to Guantanamo to participate in Fleet exercises. Lieutenants Cunningham and Smith and Sgt Maguire took part in this combined operation of sea and air forces, the first of its kind in our service history. The Navy, thereafter, took realistic cognizance of its new component. The aeroplane was not then generally envisioned as an offensive weapon, but for advance scouting it made practical sense.

The Navy air school returned to Annapolis after the maneuvers, and for the first time aviators were given a written designation of their duties. Cunningham and Smith, in letters from the SecNav dated 5 March 1913, each became "an actual flyer of heavier-than-air craft." Also, for the first time, hazards of flight were officially recognized, and an additional allowance of 35 per cent of base pay for pilots was authorized. But the Congress which inaugurated this extra remuneration was watching the purse strings and carefully stressed that no more than 30 officers of the Navy and Marine Corps be detailed to aviation service. Furthermore, none of these officers could be higher in rank than lieutenant commander or major.

On 27 December 1913 Lt B. L. Smith and 2ndLt W. M. McIlvain were ordered to report to the com-

A Curtiss, 1912—Cunningham soloed it in less than 3 hours



manding officer of the Marines' First Advance Brigade for special temporary duty and maneuvers with the Atlantic Fleet. On 3 January 1914, the two flyers, with two Navy flying boats and all 7 of the enlisted aviation personnel sailed from Philadelphia aboard the *Hancock*. Smith was in charge of the "Aviation Detachment of the Brigade."

These maneuvers, lasting about one month, marked the first instance of Marine air being attached to a Marine ground organization. But, possessing only two planes the "detachment" was hardly a full-fledged aviation unit. In addition, records fail to indicate that the flight missions accomplished off Puerto Rico had any co-operative association with troop activities.

Meanwhile, Lt Cunningham found extra time from his Washington duties to keep pace in experimental and planning phases of Naval Aviation. He advised in the construction of, and test flew, a new Navy flying boat. He also became a member of a board, headed by Capt Chambers, which recommended establishment of a Navy Aeronautical Station at Pensacola, Florida. In early 1914, erection of this station was underway on the site of an abandoned Navy Yard, and at the conclusion of the Puerto Rican maneuvers, the flying Marines returned to shore at the new air center.

Just before Europe burst into flames in the summer of 1914,

Barney Smith played a key role in a significant experiment. The Marine flyer and Lt V. D. Herbster, USN, made the first Navy live bombing tests, and the important data gathered as a result of dropping four small bombs led to more rapid improvement in ordnance design, bomb sights and bomb release mechanisms.

Smith's keen knowledge and aptitude for the technical aspects of aviation were held in high regard. In less than 30 days after the Kaiser's armies began to goose-step across Europe, Lt Smith was on his way to Paris to become Assistant American Attache. For 3 years he visited every battle front and studied aviation under all conditions. Upon his return to the US in 1917, his superior officially reported that Smith "under practical war conditions, had as much knowledge of the theory and practice of aviation as any officer in the world and that he would be invaluable to the country on aviation duty."

While Americans were watching the war from the sidelines, US military aviation began to emerge from the crude stages of its pioneering days. But with Smith in Paris and only McIlvain flying in this country, Leatherneck air power was still an embryo. Although 10 pilots and 40 men were authorized for aviation duty, and an Aviation Company for duty with the Advance Brigade Force was anticipated, expeditionary com-

mitments did not permit transfer of even the authorized allowance from ground to air.


THE SHOT IN THE ARM NEEDED to bring Marine Aviation to life came on 30 January 1917. Captain A. A. Cunningham was ordered to the Philadelphia Navy Yard to make advance preparations for establishment of a Marine Corps Aeronautic Advance Base Unit. At last Marine flyers were to have an organization of their own. No longer to be a mere section of the Navy Flying School, Marine Aviation thus had received a long-awaited signal. The orders gave the Leatherneck air arm status and the first secure attachment to the ground forces of the Corps—the Advanced Base Force, also stationed at Philadelphia.

Then on 6 April 1917, the US entered the World War. (This was still two months before the Marine Aeronautic Detachment took complete root in Philadelphia.) Marine Aviation, standing on weak and wobbly legs, had 4 naval aviators, one student naval aviator (Lt Roy S. Geiger, designated NA on 9 June 1917), and 30 men as its total force. Yet, by war's end, 19 months later, the airmen's rolls numbered 282 officers and 2,180 men, a substantial growth considering the scarcity of aircraft and facilities for training purposes.

The expansion program was begun with great vigor. Cunningham, in command of the Aeronautic Detachment, visited Quantico and Parris Island to interview applicants for aviation duty. Officers and men were accepted for pilot training on a volunteer basis if they met the requirements: "of superior physique, weighing from 135 to 165 pounds, 2 years' college credits and between the age limits of 19 and 39 years." A 10-week ground course was set up at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with other specialists training at Great Lakes and San Diego. Actual flying instruction was given at Philadelphia, Pensacola and later, at Miami.

The aviators were hopeful of fighting with the ground forces of the Corps, but in this desire they were doomed to disappointment. As had long been their tradition, Marine troops were ready to fight at the

Miami, 1918—early flight training



outset of any trouble. In the second month after America declared war on Germany, almost 3,000 Marines were on their way to France. Aviation, of course, was not ready for immediate action and never did get to join the fray as part of a Marine Corps team. Marine Aviation had a combat service record, nonetheless, and a good one.

While the Aviation Detachment gathered equipment and trained its brood, Cunningham was sent to Europe to study the air problems of the British and French, and to get a job for his flyers. On his return he reported to the SecNav and the General Board concerning a special mission that might be accomplished by a force of Marine flyers in pursuit landplanes. British seaplanes were patrolling the coasts of Northern France and Belgium in an effort to reduce German submarine operations there. However, sufficient pursuit plane protection was unavailable to fend off the numerically superior German fighters, and the antisubmarine offensive had been largely ineffective. American landplanes would be of great value in Northern France, claimed the Marine aerial skipper.

As a result of this recommendation, the Navy created the Northern Bombing Group, a composite Marine Corps-Navy unit. It was proposed that the Marines provide 4 squadrons to make up a Day Wing, the Navy 4 more to operate as a Night Wing.

Before plans for the overseas mission had jelled, some of the Philadelphia personnel were detached to form the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company. This unit, equipped with two Curtiss R-6 seaplanes, was sent to Cape May, NJ, in October 1917 for patrol duty along the coast. Two months later the Company received a surprise reassignment. On 9 January 1918, with Lt Francis Evans in command, the unit (11 officers, 117 men and 18 seaplanes and flying boats) set sail for Ponta Delgada, Azores—the first completely equipped American aviation unit to leave the United States for service in the war. There, in the Azores, the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company spent the remainder of the conflict on antisubmarine patrol.

During the next 7 months, the re-

maining aerial contingent expanded and trained, moved from Philadelphia to Long Island to Louisiana and finally to Miami. There, at the first Marine Corps Flying Field—erected with temporary facilities on a barren spot near the Everglades—the 1st Marine Aviation Force came into being. By June 1918, a British observer proclaimed the Force's 4 squadrons as combat-ready as any he had ever seen, and on the 18th of that month 3 of the squadrons sailed for France. They moved to the Calais-Dunkerque area on 6 August and began developing airfields at Oye and LaFresne. The 4th Squadron joined later, on 5 October, to bring the total Day Wing strength up to 165 officers and 982 men.


Although personnel and facilities were completely organized and ready for combat within two weeks after arrival in France, the Marines did not have a single plane. Seventy-two DeHavilland's DH-4s were ordered for the 1st Marine Aviation Force before it left the US, but the first plane was not delivered until 7 September 1918.

The DH-4, an American-built

ing Group as such were greatly restricted. For two months many of the Marine flyers rotated in temporary assignment to nearby squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Marines participated in 43 separate raids with the British. Others were sent to the pilots' pool at Andembert, France for intensive training.

In order to acquire planes more rapidly, Maj Cunningham swapped Liberty engines for British DH-9a fuselages, and with a combination of the two models the Day Wing had—according to the original, handwritten log—27 aircraft when the Armistice was signed.

By the time independent operations were started, the submarine menace became negligible, and the mission of the Day Wing switched to support the French, Belgian and British troops in the big offensive against the famed Hindenburg Line. Raids were generally against railway yards and junctions, docks, ammunition dumps, supply centers and aerodromes. The flyers did considerable damage on these raids and brought back valuable information. These raids were carried out with the view



De Havillands in Belgium, 1918—Cunningham horse-traded for fuselages

model of a British-designed plane, was being shipped disassembled to England as rapidly as possible. The Marines maintained assembly and servicing facilities at Eastleigh, England and flew the craft directly to the squadrons when ready for combat. Powered with the famous 400-hp American Liberty engine, the two-place, pursuit-bomber weighed 2,400 pounds, had a top speed of 120 mph and a range of 315 miles.

Yet, due to the scarcity of aircraft, operations of the Northern Bomb-

of hindering, as much as possible, the retreat of the enemy. In one of their bombing attacks they killed approximately 30 German officers and 300 men.

The Marines were credited with 12 enemy aircraft destroyed. They carried out a total of 57 raids, and dropped 52,000 pounds of bombs. Four Day Wing airmen were killed or died of combat wounds, but the wide-spread influenza epidemic caused a far greater death toll. Thumbing through the original



Nicaragua, 1926—a new and even greater field of action

daily log one can count 17 enlisted and 3 officer dead from the dreaded flu.

LESS THAN A MONTH AFTER THE Armistice, the 1st Marine Aviation Force departed for the United States, and at home Marine Corps Aviation faced a new and formidable task; the aviators had yet to sell aviation to the rest of the Marine Corps.

Said Maj Cunningham in the *GAZETTE* of September 1920: "One of the greatest handicaps which Marine Corps Aviation must now overcome is a combination of doubt as to usefulness, lack of sympathy, and a feeling on the part of some line officers that aviators and aviation men are not real Marines." In behalf of all Marine airmen, he took violent exception to the latter feeling, as being completely unjust; by performance he was perfectly willing for aviation to prove its own usefulness, and when given the opportunity to do so, he was supremely confident that it would win the sympathy and hearty support of Marine officers.

The Major's own words, in this same article, express the concept toward which Marine Aviation steered its course for the next 20 years: *It is fully realized that the only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations.*

In the first year after World War I, aviation had had to concern itself primarily with acquiring the physical means with which to carry on its operations. Through legislation, permanent status was achieved; 1,020 men were authorized, by law, for Marine aviation duty. Then the

Navy Dept, which handled the expenditure of all aviation funds, approved the construction of flying fields at Quantico, Parris Island and San Diego.

But even as this important foundation for permanency was being laid, Marine airmen began their close and lasting association with their own ground troops. During the years that followed the war, the Corps, in addition to its regular peace time duties, became engaged in supporting US foreign policy in the Caribbean countries. Expeditionary forces of Marines had been sent to Haiti and Santo Domingo previous to our entry in the World War. Following the European conflict, Marines, ground and air, were sent to restore peace in those turbulent countries where large groups of bandits were terrorizing the law abiding elements and defying the nationally constituted governments.

In 1919 the 1st Marine Aviation Force was disbanded. Its units (Squadrons 1, 2, 3 and 4 were redesignated A, B, C and D while in France) were reshuffled so as to provide an air component for the Marine ground units in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and at the same time furnish a nucleus for Marine Aviation establishments at Quantico and Parris Island.

In February, 1919, the 1st Division of Squadron D was transferred to the Dominican Republic. A fifth squadron, E, organized at Miami the same month, was moved to Haiti where they co-operated with ground patrols, developed an efficient transport service, and provided the answer to a serious problem in commu-

nications in those countries of uncharted mountains and wild jungles. Before the end of 1919, Squadrons A and C set up operations at Quantico, while Squadron B moved to Parris Island. Subsequently, the remaining elements of Squadron D not in Santo Domingo became Observation Squadron 1, and moved to San Diego in 1924.

An aviation unit, designated Flight L, was organized at Quantico in 1921 and transferred to Guam in order to establish a new air station on that island. The Marines' Guam station later became the Pan-American Airways Station when that commercial company began flying to the Philippines. The hangars were used for the first clippers and Marine quarters there were converted into the Pan-American Hotel. The small detachment of Leatherneck airmen at Guam, however, operated on a shoestring basis for more than a decade, making training flights and gathering meteorological data with only 4 planes. In 1927, 100 officers and men of the Guam unit—by then called Scouting Squadron 1—were detached for duty in China, but VS-1 remained in the Marianas until 1931, when they were withdrawn.

While the aviators who went to China did not participate in actual combat operations, they did render invaluable aid to the ground forces in obtaining information, making aerial photographs, and establishing and maintaining communications, particularly between the 3d Marine Brigade at Tientsin and the US Legation at Peking. MajGen Smedley D. Butler, who commanded the 3d Brigade in China, in a letter written to the MajGen Commandant in 1930 said: "I have always believed that had it not been for the splendidly efficient air force attached to the 3d Brigade in China, we could not have avoided bloodshed. The air force was of more value to me than a regiment."

A NEW AND EVEN GREATER FIELD of action for Marine Aviation proved to be Nicaragua, following the revolutionary outbreaks which began in that country during the latter part of 1926. Flying over that wild and rugged country in all kinds of weather, Marine Aviation not only co-operated with the ground

forces, as they had done in Haiti, Santo Domingo and China, but fought bandit groups under Sandino and other leaders in a number of sharp offensive engagements.

The Marines' first important aerial contact with bandits was made in 1927, when several hundred bandits laid siege to the small garrison at Ocotal, consisting of 38 Marine troops and 49 Guardia Nacional. A flight of Marine planes made its way for over 100 miles through a tropical storm and routed the bandits. A few months later, aviators assisted in routing 1,000 entrenched bandits with a bombing technique which was the fore-runner of modern day dive-bombing, and which had been employed experimentally against the guerrillas in the Santo Domingo and Haitian campaigns. They had carried out the first recorded air attack directed by ground troops. A troop commander had signaled to the flyers by laying out panels of white cloth on the ground to indicate the direction and range of the enemy. Close air support of friendly troops was developing on the proving grounds of actual combat.

In addition to the combat mis-

men on foot to cover, and they saved many Marine lives by air evacuation of wounded.

An outstanding instance of evacuation occurred early in 1928 when a large Marine patrol was ambushed at a small village more than 100 miles away from hospital facilities. There was no landing field in that remote part of the country, but there were wounded Marines that desperately needed medical attention. Even though the conflict was still raging, 1st Lt Christian F. Schilt volunteered to fly them out, if a makeshift landing strip could be provided. By demolishing part of the village, the Marines improvised a short runway, barely long enough for a plane to land and take-off on. Under almost continuous rifle and machine gun fire from the surrounding hills, Schilt made 10 trips to land with much needed supplies and take-off with 18 wounded men. Lt Schilt was awarded the Medal of Honor for this heroic accomplishment.

Tactical flying officially ended in Nicaragua on 15 December 1932, and on 1 January 1933 the Marine airmen, who had greatly fostered the

for the Hydrographic Office, US Navy.

In June and July 1921, Marine aviators from Quantico participated in bombing experiments against the former German battleship, *Ostfriesland*, and the ex-USS *Iowa* off the Atlantic Coast, and were commended for their excellent accuracy. Marines also participated in the various air races, winning their share, and crack teams of "Hell Divers" were featured at air shows where they put on dive bombing and aerobatic exhibitions.

Other flying Leathernecks established a number of long-distance records such as a 10,953-mile flight in 1922 by two pilots and their mechanics from Haiti to San Francisco and return—at that time the longest continuous flight in American aviation history, and the second longest flight in the world. In 1930, Capt Arthur H. Page made the longest recorded blind flight up to that time; he flew from Omaha, Nebraska, to Anacostia, Washington, DC, entirely by instrument in a light-tight cockpit.


The Marine Corps started experiments in dropping parachute troops as early as 1927. It is interesting to note that the Marines, not the Russians nor the Germans as is commonly thought, were originators of the parachute troop idea.

Corps aviators of VS-14M and VS-15M began to fly off the Navy's "flat tops" in 1931 and for 3 years they rotated between land and sea duty on such stalwarts as the *Lexington*, *Saratoga* and *Langley*. Capt William J. Wallace, VS-15M commander, was the first Marine pilot to land on a carrier, both by day and by night. Provision of replacement squadrons in Navy carrier operations became the secondary mission of Marine Aviation.

Still as its prime mission, however, was—as had been intended from inception—the support of Marine Corps ground troops. Seasoned by the widest range of military aerial assignments ever known in times of nominal peace, the Marine Corps air arm was approaching full maturity upon the eve of WWII.

Since then, the Marine Corps has stood ready as a single team, a coordinated vanguard of vigilance and action—on land, on sea, AND IN THE AIR.

USMC



USS Saratoga, 1931 — pilots rotated from ship to shore

sions, airmen in Nicaragua undertook a wide variety of tasks which often eliminated many long hours of hiking for the troops. They carried mail, transported supplies and personnel to and from the widespread garrisons. During this occupation, over 5 million dollars in cash was dropped by the flyers to the troops in the field. This method of paying had never been attempted before but proved highly successful. They carried out reconnaissance missions in a matter of hours over bush lands that would have required weeks for

co-operative spirit of ground and air, returned in a long overland flight to Quantico.

BETWEEN the two World Wars, Marine Aviation was kept busy with its diversified training, as well as experimentation and development of aircraft, aerial tactics and techniques, and other aspects of aviation. Marine airmen made aerial photographs of the coast and rivers of Santo Domingo and Haiti for the US Geological Survey and made an aerial survey of the coasts of Cuba

A New Name

*Piasecki Helicopter Corporation
has changed its name to*

VERTOL Aircraft Corporation

We have changed our name to better reflect the full range of our current activities and future operations.

Today, our programs include not only helicopters, but radically new types of aircraft which also have vertical take-off and landing capabilities.

The change in name does not change our type of business; nor does it signify any change in personnel or policies. It is a timely change geared to advanced concepts of research, development and preliminary design in the entire field of vertical lift aircraft.

Under the *Vertol** name, you may expect to see many newer, more advanced aircraft become operational alongside such pacemakers in helicopter development as the famous HUP fleet helicopter, the H-21 "Work Horse" and the H-16 "Transporter."



MORTON, PENNSYLVANIA

CABLE ADDRESS: VERTOL

*The name *Vertol* is a contraction of the words
VERTical Take Off and Landing.

in brief

Everyone in the Marine Corps will be burning the midnight oil shortly learning a new-type drill. Some time this month all units will receive advance copies of the new manual in letter form, later this year a complete new manual for Marines exclusively will be published and all troops will be expected to be proficient in the new drill by 1 January 1957.

Based on the 13-man squad and retaining the integrity of the fire team, the new system combines the best features of both types of drill now in use in the Marine Corps. It should eliminate the confusion attendant on FMF units using LPM 1950 drill while Posts and stations are doing "Squads Right."

The new system was developed by the Test and Training Regiment of MCS Quantico, and last year it was sent to selected units in the field for test and comment. Modifications were incorporated based on this constructive criticism and the new drill was officially adopted last month.

The 3 Mar Div Association annual reunion will be held in Chicago, 29 June. For complete details write to Leonard Pritikin, 2942 Rosemont Ave., Chicago 45, Ill.

The Kaman HOK (below), newest member in the Corps' Helicopter family has recently been turned over to all VMO squadrons for operational use. It has synchropter-type rotors and it is designed for aerial observation work.



A new directive system has been adopted by the Marine Corps that reduces the number of types of directives from 16 to 4 and provides a filing system that groups all directives by subject.

The 4 types of directives to be used in the new system are: *Orders* which will contain matter directive in nature and non susceptible to incorporation in local command regulations; *Bulletins* will contain matter that is informational in nature, of temporary duration and is not considered appropriate for promulgation as an order; *Letter-type* releases may be either directive or informational and should contain provisions for their own cancellation; *Message-type* can be directive or informational such as ALMARs and ALMARCONs, will be interfiled in the system and will be preceded in the text by an abbreviated notation as to its classification (ie—*Order* or *Bulletin*) followed by the appropriate subject-numerical designation. Complete instructions and information on the new system are contained in a publication titled *The Marine Corps Directives System—an Introduction to Marine Corps Order 5215.1*.

The Navy's new guided missile submarine, included in the fiscal 1956 ship-building program, will be driven by nuclear power. In another change, two conventional attack submarines, the *Grayback* and the *Growler*, now under construction, will be completed as guided missile submarines. The changes in the construction program were made to take full advantage of new technological developments. The guided missile submarines (SSG) and the nuclear powered guided missile submarine (SSGN) will receive capabilities for launching the surface-to-surface missile "Regulus."



At graduation ceremonies for the 4-55 Basic Course held at MCS, Quantico, LtGen E. A. Pollock presented the Marine Corps Association sword to 2dLt R. M. Janopaul (above). This is the third Marine Corps Association sword award to be presented to honor graduates of the Basic School.

An atomic clock, accurate to within a billionth of a second was exhibited recently in New York.

It is described as the first commercially available atomic frequency standard. Its extreme frequency stability, which is far beyond that of any previous time-measuring instrument, will enable scientists to make rapid strides in many industries and fields of research.

It will, for example, make possible the design of radio receivers and transmitting equipment of unprecedented narrow and precise bandwidth. This in turn means that crowded airwaves, which often result in one station or channel interfering with another, can be more efficiently utilized. It is very likely that more than twice the present number of stations can be put on the air without expanding the receiver dial. It is expected to be used in many "defense system concepts."

The Military Conference and Annual Convention of the Marine Corps Reserve Officer's Association will be held on May 25-26 at the Hotel Washington in Washington, DC.


Marine Corps Reserve officers from all over the country are invited to attend. It will be a military conference which will outline, within security bounds, the plans and policies of the Marine Corps especially those that relate to the Reserve program.

❖ The Chrysler experimental gas turbine has been installed in a 1956 stock model Plymouth (right) and has just completed a series of road tests. The radically-different engine is 200 pounds lighter than the average piston-type, has less vibration, requires very little lubrication, uses a wide range of cheap fuels such as kerosene and fuel oil and has two thirds less moving parts. The man on the right holds the power turbine wheel, duplicate of the one in the engine which supplies driving force to the car's rear wheels.



❖ Pilots will learn to fly the XFV-1 Pogo vertical takeoff plane in a special tether test rig now being erected at Brown Naval Auxiliary Air Station. (below)

The two side towers of the arch will be 150 feet high and the connecting bridge up at the top will be 150 feet wide. The large area inside the framework will enable pilots to maneuver the plane both vertically and horizontally while learning to fly the Pogo.



❖ Mine warfare ships of the US and Canadian Navies will take part in mine-sweeping exercises off Halifax this month. The exercise will be called "Sweep Clear One" and it will be the first NATO minesweeping exercise ever held in the Western Atlantic. Helicopters and UDT units will also participate in the maneuver.

❖ The hottest pilots and ground crewmen of the El Toro-based 3d MAW held their first aerial gunnery meet recently. The meet featured air-to-air firing at towed targets and skip bombing and strafing of ground targets at the Mojave Air Station gunnery range. Aviation gunnery meets of this type were advocated in an article titled *An Air Proficiency Trophy* written by LtCol R. F. Stienkraus and featured in the Nov '55 GAZETTE.

❖ World War II veterans of the Soviet Union's Moslem republics have been reportedly formed into a "volunteer" fighting brigade.

Informed sources in Vienna said Soviet Army veterans in Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan had been called up for active duty on a volunteer basis in the last two months. Soviet Moslem soldiers serving in occupation units in eastern Europe have been transferred to their home garrisons and were concentrated in a special brigade to undergo stiff training under the direction of desert war experts.

According to best estimates, there are 20,000,000 Moslems living in the USSR.

❖ An Army colonel may be posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor through the efforts of Marines who served with him during the historic breakout from the Chosin reservoir to the sea.

Attention, first focused on Col John Page, a professional Army artillery officer, when the Marine Corps awarded him the Navy Cross for his heroic action in Korea. The commendation stated that many more men are alive today who would not have made it back had it not been for Col Page.

By law, the Medal of Honor must be awarded within 3 years of the action cited, but the saga of John Page went unnoticed until it was too late. However, the Senate now has a bill under consideration designed to open for review all such cases for one year.

❖ A new Army airborne combat division, the 101st, will be organized to incorporate the most modern concepts of military science.

Atomic capability will be provided within the division artillery by an "Honest John" rocket unit. Other new weapons and equipment will include the SPAT, a self-propelled 90mm gun that can be delivered by parachute; a family of new lightweight trucks; the "Mechanical Mule," a 4-wheel steering, low-silhouette vehicle with a cargo capacity of 1,000 pounds; lightweight general-purpose machine guns; 105mm mortars; lightweight construction equipment and a large number of observation aircraft and helicopters.

Signal equipment will include an airborne television system to enable a commander to receive latest front-line information and a radio "guide system" using low frequency radio signals to provide a continuous all-weather flight position picture for helicopter and mobile ground units.

The division will have 5 combat groups, each being a self-contained force, and will have a total strength of approximately 11,500 — 6,000 fewer personnel than a conventional airborne division.

❖ An in-flight refueling system for helicopters has been developed by the Marine Corps Development Center and HMX-1, the Marine Corps' experimental helicopter squadron (right).

The new method, when developed, will enable helicopters to take off with greater pay loads and will affect the Marine Corps-developed "vertical envelopment" concept. By the use of it, 'copters will have increased operating ranges and tactical commanders will have the advantage of being able to order greater dispersion.

For some time, in-flight refueling of helicopters was held impractical because of the danger to fuel lines from the whirling rotor blades. But HMX-1 technicians licked the problem and successfully demonstrated that it could be done.

BuAer has announced that it is accepting industry bids on contracts for the development of the idea.



By LtCol R. P. Keller

THE FRAMERS OF THE NATIONAL Security Act of 1947, as amended by Public Law 416, chose their words carefully and well when they stated that "The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms. . ." The fact that *organization* is given emphasis by first mention indicates its importance. Given two opposing forces equally well trained and equipped, the one which is organized most effectively almost surely will prevail. Organization is the key to any endeavor involving related efforts of diverse groupings seeking a common goal.

Unfortunately, it is not always easy to tell when an optimum organizational pattern has been derived to suit an established purpose. Furthermore, what is optimum during one year, or one decade, may become a complete anachronism almost over night, when significant, quick changes occur in the circumstances upon which depends its validity.

The phalanxes of Alexander's time, Caesar's maniples, cohorts and legions, were phenomenally successful military groupings. They suited the conditions of their day. In modern times, the Marine Corps amphibious assault division stands as another functional, effective, purposeful and successful military formation. However, good organization must be considered an elusive, even ephemeral, quality that constantly must be pursued if, once attained, it is to be maintained.

The true test of organization, as of all other military involvements, is combat. Marine Corps organizational principles in the past have been translated into formations which have passed that test on every occasion. The formations of tomorrow, which are being derived to meet future combat situations, now are in genesis. All of us can have an impact upon this evolution. All of us should. Most of us will.

The purpose of this article is to discuss combat organization within the Marine Corps, and to contribute some thoughts on that subject for whatever incitement or catalytic value they may have to the thinking of others. Before doing this, however, it may be well to review briefly the primary types of employ-

FIGHTING

ment for Marine Corps combat formations in order to keep freshly in mind the purpose of our organization. Then, it may be of use to state a number of organizational principles which, it appears to this writer, have governed in the Marine Corps in the past. Following that, we can take a look at several different organizations for combat possible to us.

The Marine Corps primarily is charged with responsibilities in the area of the amphibious operation. This unique military operation is characterized by the following conditions, amongst others: movement of forces from ship to shore in a fighting posture; quickly building up combat power ashore (including aviation) in the face of enemy action; an initial lack of the heaviest fire support means organic within the assault elements of the landing force; major dependence upon a variety of supporting actions to stem from outside the landing force; the necessity for quick consolidation action and preparation for possible violent enemy counter-operations originating from outside the objective area; an absolute requirement for the maximum feasible co-ordination and split-second timing between and within the landing force and all supporting elements.

The foregoing characteristics generally pertain whether considering nuclear or non-nuclear action.

The Marine Corps, by its nature and in consideration of its historical employment, is a "force-in-readiness." It is generally recognized that a relatively small, ready, mobile military organization, employed early in a combat situation, can pay great dividends which would be earned later only at the expense of much greater casualties. The Marine Corps is committed to this force-in-readiness concept and equipped, trained and operated with that concept uppermost in mind. To perpetuate this capability, there must be established—and adhered to—heavy, closely co-ordinated training schedules, and appropriate effort placed upon maintenance of material readiness. The closest super-

vision and necessary integration of all components of the Marine Corps fighting team must be feasible, so that the transition from peace to war can be effected efficiently and without lost motion when the necessity arises, and so that the integrity of the forces necessary to accomplish a mission can be assured during transition through changing combat phases.

These two pre-eminent fields of endeavor for the Marine Corps are critical in every respect. They require that maximum military effectiveness be extracted from forces of a given size, sufficient to accomplish the mission assigned those forces, under especially rigorous and unique conditions.

From the foregoing relatively concise statements of Marine Corps responsibilities and conscious of past practices, the following general principles are submitted as having special significance to our combat organization.

Flexibility

There must be built into Marine Corps formations an inherent flexibility, permitting transition to an effective combat posture in reaction to any of a wide variety of military situations. Flexibility may take many forms. For the purpose of this writing, it means a rational organization of a cellular-structure nature, such that if part is destroyed, the rest can live and function. It means that, starting from the lowest grouping within the total force, each successively higher combination of groupings is patterned to give the requisite, rounded combat capability determined proper for a military element of that particular level. It means that the commander may employ, re-group and delegate command of his component elements with the degree of facility required to match any likely military situation with which he may be faced.

Economy

Manpower consistently is critically short. At no time is it in such supply as to permit waste. Any combat organization is morally bound to

FORMATIONS

conserve, not only its irreplaceable human resources while accomplishing its mission, but also its expensive materiel. This economy requirement is served by defining the various subordinate tasks which contribute to the consummation of victory in battle, and then apportioning and forming manpower and materiel resources in such manner as to accomplish those tasks efficiently. A not considerable attribute to be sought here is the perspicacity and perceptivity of individual intellectual competence, to define tasks, organize resources and employ forces effectively. This is the purpose of our schools, career management programs and selection system.

Mobility

There are two basic types of mobility—strategic and tactical. Strategic mobility has to do with the movement of a combat force from a rear base to a combat area in timely manner and adequate strength. Tactical mobility refers to movement within the combat area in the face of, and in contact with, enemy forces. Both types of mobility are served by reduction of impedimenta, swiftness of transportation media, readiness to move on minimum notice and an effective re-supply system designed to function on short notice. However, there may be conflicting aspects to the two types of mobility. For example, the swiftest transportation medium from a rear base to a combat area could be a 600-mile an hour jet transport aircraft. This could give real strategic mobility to a combat force. Unfortunately, a force lifted in such

manner would probably have little tactical mobility when in the combat area. The vehicles needed to provide proper tactical mobility, perhaps would be too numerous and too heavy in sum for long-range airlift. Therefore, they may be absent, or at best not present in sufficient supply.

Logic

Any military force must determine its internal organization, so as to take best advantage of its combat means. Implicit to this thought are determinations such as, how many and what kinds of weapons will be employed, their probable sequence and relationships of employment, their control and internal administrative support.

Unity

It is axiomatic that the commander of a military force should be given the tools necessary to complete the mission assigned him. All components of his force must be conditioned constantly and closely under common direction. The principle of unity must remain inviolable during preparation for combat if it is to obtain during actual combat operations. Only by materiel readiness, common doctrine, tactics and techniques, a high state of training and the necessary degree of common familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of each component, can the maximum degree of preparation for battle victory be provided.

If our combat organization measures up well against the principles discussed above, we can rest reasonably assured that the impact of Marine Corps fighting formations upon

any enemy engaged will continue to be most weighty and effective.

Now, what is our present-day organization for combat? What are other possibly advantageous organizations, in consideration of changing conditions and equipment for conflict? Of these, which may be best?

As of now, Marine Corps combat units are organized primarily on a vertical basis, between ground and aviation. Let us for our purposes here assume that each, separately, is efficiently organized. The key, therefore, to a major organizational problem within the Marine Corps appears to lie in the continual achievement of an optimum amalgamation of aviation and ground formations. To what degree, at what levels and in what detail will amalgamation or integration of aviation and ground elements best serve the combat capabilities of the Marine Corps as a whole?

When there is a job to be done calling for both basic combat elements, it is now projected that an "air-ground task force" will be assembled, to look something like Chart I. (In each of the somewhat over-simplified organization patterns to be described below, it is implicit that necessary communication and control means are provided to make possible co-ordinated effort between all components. Without these tools, no commander could employ any formation effectively.) This is a simple, functional organization, which has evolved primarily on an empirical basis. It is under critical examination and close, continuous scrutiny, to evaluate its applicability to future, fast moving combat situations, which may or may not be nuclear in nature.

It recognizes the rather peculiar administrative support requirements of each of the basic components—ground and aviation—and the very different supply and support systems and agencies which are used by the individual components. The term "administrative support" is used in its very broadest sense throughout this article. It does not connote mere "paper-shuffling" here.

CHART I




CHART II





CHART III



An example of what is included in this broad term is the Naval aeronautical support establishment.

That complex, highly technical establishment, designed to support efficient combat aviation operations in the Navy and Marine Corps, is conditioned now to deal with current Marine Corps aviation organization. Any marked change in that organization, suddenly accomplished, could result in an extended period of confusion until the complex aviation support establishment of the Department of the Navy could digest that change. During that period, combat potentials of aviation likely would be reduced. This, of course, is merely an example. It simply reflects the fact that any human pattern, once established, to some extent resists change. This is neither good nor bad, nor more characteristic of one establishment than another, generally speaking. It just "is." However, it is not and should not be, a deterrent to necessary changes in organization.

Chart II shows a possible new organization, designed to provide a closer integration of the component elements of a Marine Corps combat force. This could trend out of the task-force category, into a more per-

manent structure. It has the characteristic of providing a more closely knit *overall* combat structure—perhaps at some penalty to efficiency in some subordinate components. This latter may result from coupling combat and service elements at relatively low military echelons, which have rather different characteristics and divergent support requirements. For example, the handling of various categories of supplies in a more or less mixture supply system, i.e., encompassing both aviation and ground needs, might tend to complicate the satisfaction of requirements for each. On the other hand, amalgamation at the "grass roots," so to speak, of all combat elements required to support a commander's mission, should give some assurance that they will be available and ready for employment when needed.

Chart III shows still another possible basic formation for the balanced Marine Corps combat force. It is somewhere in between the organizations shown in Charts I and II. As such, perhaps it has merit as a moderate approach to organizational transition. Advantages and disadvantages, both, of Charts I and II are embodied in the structure of Chart III. However, they are pres-

ent to a diluted extent.

Before discussing these 3 charts, the question was asked "... which may be best?" There is no intention, however, of attempting to answer that question here. Indeed, none of them may be "best." It is for the readers of this article rather to make their own decision, if they desire one. Better yet, since this article hardly has done more than scratch the surface of a knotty, vital problem area, would be further original thought on that subject. However, one caution—or admonition—may be in order here. And that is, before anyone intelligently can embark upon an examination of Marine Corps combat organizational structure, he must give some thought to:

- a) Basic ground organizational requirements for efficient, effective combat employment.
- b) Basic aviation organizational requirements for efficient, effective combat employment.

- c) The degree to which one or the other can or should be compromised, if necessary, so that the formation which is a combination of the two can attain maximum overall effectiveness in amphibious operations and as a force-in-readiness.

The question, if there is one, "Who commands what component?" is not considered a part of the problem discussed here, except as it relates to the principle of unity noted earlier above. Primary consideration is intended for the problem of attaining and maintaining the maximum combat potential within the fighting formations of the Marine Corps. It is for this reason that the charts used for illustration do not mention specific, standard organizations of the Fleet Marine Forces as they now exist.

By the proper combination of chemical elements, an overwhelmingly powerful ordnance has been developed—the atomic weapon.

Similarly, by the proper combination of military elements, a characteristic, uniquely effective fighting force must be developed in the Marine Corps to match the challenge of the near future.

There is no instance of which this writer is aware, where a job that needed doing was not well done if enough Marines applied themselves to it. How about it? US MC

A Cessna friend "Upstairs" keeps them on the target

Among other things, Army pilots serve as flying artillery spotters. One of their many vital jobs is keeping U. S. Artillery "on target."

In training, these pilot-soldiers not only learn flying—they receive instruction in all military branches—Infantry, Medical, Transportation, Armored, Communications and Engineering, as well as Artillery.

To handle these varied jobs, they need an airplane as versatile as their training! That's why they fly Cessna L-19's. Combat-proved L-19's are versatile. They can take it, too! They're easy to fly, easy to service, powerful and dependable.

Cessna has delivered every L-19 to U. S. Armed Forces on schedule since 1951. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Wichita, Kansas.

Cessna





realistic readiness

Since combat is our function, the worth of our aviation training program depends on our pilots' ability to hit realistic targets under realistic conditions

TACTICS, EQUIPMENT STANDARDS and training requirements are established in accordance with, and measured by, a scale called *Readiness*. To use this scale properly it is essential to approach a complete understanding of what is meant by readiness and how readiness is attained. From there, the next step is the employment of the scale to measure what we have in order to ascertain what improvements are needed in tactics, equipment and pilot performance.

Certainly everyone knows what is meant by readiness—the state of being prepared; and how readiness is attained—through training. It is as simple as that, or should be. However, because of their very simplicity these terms are too often lightly passed over with resulting failure to satisfy the requirement they set.

Readiness is the state of being prepared, but it is necessary to understand completely what we are preparing for.

A military establishment is maintained to enforce national objectives.

A military establishment should therefore be readied for combat and combat only. Any other considerations are entirely supplementary to

this paramount factor.

Readiness is attained through training.

If we understand that we are preparing for combat we therefore understand that we must train for combat.

Combat and the use of weapons are synonymous.

This then is the key—a military establishment exists solely for the purpose of employing weapons.

I have gone through this rather involved process of adding 2 and 2 because I feel that in certain instances we have been losing sight of our target—which is, again—proficiency in weapons employment. Training programs which may have originally been designed to improve our ability for weapons employment have apparently become means unto themselves, demanding time at the expense of weapons training. One of the clearest examples of this at the present time is the instrument training program. Keeping in mind the fact that we are in business only

to carry a gun, let's look at this instrument training requirement.

An instrument rating is mandatory for all Service Group I pilots. This is fine—we can never become too proficient in the art of instrument flying—we have no room for fair weather aviators.

The instrument qualification is based almost entirely on civil airways flying. This is not so fine—it is only, at best, a bare indication of the tactical, off-airways, formation, weapons-delivery capability. It is obvious that here we have lost sight of our reason for being. This, I believe, demonstrates a basic flaw in our system, for every item of all tactical squadron syllabi should be directed toward improving weapons delivery. Instrument flying in the military is not a pure airline function. The instrument flying requirement should be based on a capability to fly IFR under tactical conditions where weapons delivery is expected. All pilots attached to tactical squadrons should qualify annually with the basic air weapons of their units as well as qualifying for military instrument flight.

Please understand that I am not

By LtCol S. B. Folsom

decrying the importance of instrument training—I am merely pointing out that it is a contributing means to weapons delivery and not an end to itself.

In summary of this point, it should be remembered that the gun is the thing. To realize this, each training factor should be evaluated in accordance with one question: how will this contribute to weapons delivery?

In the field of improvements needed, the recommendation can be summed up under a single main requirement entitled *Realism*. Readiness suffers through an unforgivable lack of training realism.

Lack of realism in training tactics + lack of realism in training equipment = a lack of realism in pilot performance.

Like a football team practicing without scrimmaging and without scouting the opponent prior to the game, we impress ourselves with our uncontested plays. We practice bombing and rocketry on bull's eyes whitewashed on the ground. We practice strafing on stationary white squares. We practice air-to-air gunnery on relatively slow moving banners. These may be acceptable targets for primary training, but once having served their introductory purpose they are poor substitutes for the real thing. Training should not be made as easy as possible for the pilot—it should be made as difficult as possible in accordance with the combat pattern. Targets should be hit day, night and in bad

weather.

Ground targets utilizing, to a large extent, cast off materials and equipment can be constructed on existing ranges. This has been done in a few cases—Carrizo Canyon at El Centro for one—however, it should be the general procedure rather than the occasional. Old vehicles, simulated supply dumps, buildings, trenches (camouflaged and dispersed) should be employed. Obsolete tanks with added protective armor, radio controlled or crew controlled where small caliber or frangible weapons are used, should be made available. It is time to sound taps on the day when the pilot finds his first mobile target in enemy hands.

Enemy targets have mobility—training targets should have mobility.

Enemy targets are camouflaged—training targets should be camouflaged.

Enemy targets are dug in—training targets should be dug in.

Enemy targets operate during darkness and bad weather—training targets should be operated during darkness and bad weather.

All of these ground target problems are open to easy solution if we will only use the initiative and imagination necessary to set up the ranges.

The air training targets present a more difficult problem. Banners and other tow targets have inherent weakness such as safety cones and lack of maneuverability. Drones,

which in theory produce the most realism, are slow in development and very expensive—at the best they will be available for graduation exercises. A solution appears to be increased emphasis on camera gunnery. With the exception of the absence of actual gun fire, all factors are favorable. An aircraft is used as the target thereby producing realistic size, shape, speed and maneuver patterns. Practice area restrictions are greatly reduced allowing training where actual firing would be precluded. Tail cone runs which, despite other teachings, are still the way to make kills, are practicable. Economies in weapons, targets and associated expenditures may be realized. Here again we have the basic ingredients for proper training, but we need the interest of all involved to get the show on the road. Cameras must be improved, pilots must be sold on the program and, above all, film processing must be simplified and expedited.

In conclusion—if we in our training, base our requirements on a full realization:

That combat is our function;

That the application of weapons on the enemy is the climax of this function;

That in the final analysis the worth of the training program is directly tied to the pilot's ability to hit a realistic target under realistic conditions: then our tactical doctrine will fall into line and we will have brought readiness to the highest attainable level. US ♣ MC




sergeant in October and 2 months later the warrant officer list contained his selection to W1.

In short, during the period in which many of us were not promoted at all, and most of us counted ourselves lucky to have received one increase in pay and prestige, this Marine was raised through the staff grades to the much coveted position of warrant officer. To some, this almost incredulous succession of promotion seemed unfair; to others of us who knew the subject individual and had worked with him this Marine's good fortune came as a result of the Marine Corps' recognition of good, hard work.

The writer served with this man for 18 months. This service relationship was one in which his efforts were under my direct observation and supervision. To point up his efforts and practices (which were quickly recognized and rewarded by his superiors and HQMC) for the observation and study of other leaders is the object of this paper. Most of us know the "how" and "why" of leadership, but few of us have ever worked as hard to put these "hows"

this proficient leadership. Marines respect leaders who have the know-how and who can give the answers as they are in the books. The extra effort put out here paid off in immediate results in the section when his men followed suit by cracking books in their spare time in an attempt to also know the answers. It took far less urging on the leader's part to work for a more professional attitude among his men and a more thorough knowledge of their occupation, and thereby a more efficient discharge of their duties as military instructors. The results of this extra effort, insofar as benefiting the subject himself, is now apparent to all.

Secondly, I want to mention the hours added to his working day. Our subject was in early in the morning, before the first instructor got in. If it appeared that a part of the support for instruction his section was about to give—ammunition, communications, transportation etc.—was going to be late, he would get hot on the telephone and get things moving. His day was not over until the last instructor was in, the last weapon cleaned and the last bit of



THE SELECTIONS CONTAINED IN the last promotion list for Master Sergeant in the O3 field, and those contained in the list of Staff NCOs who were selected for warrant officer, were the cause of a great deal of comment. The feeling among many of our senior noncommissioned officers was that their efforts, their loyalty, their seniority and their faithful service had been overlooked by Headquarters. The selection of one man in particular created a prodigious amount of comment and speculation. A man who was a staff sergeant back in 1951 made master

ENERGY IN

and "whys" to work. There is no substitute for *energy* in leadership. The following are some of the things that this leader did to earn his rapid promotion. At the time of these observations this man was a section chief of an instructor section in a training regiment.

First, he studied to maintain professional leadership in his section. The unit commander would publish in advance the subjects in which noncommissioned officers would be tested. Our subject would gather up all the references and take them home to study. As a result he always passed his proficiency examinations with high grades. The instructors in his section took pride in the fact that their chief was always found to be proficient in the knowing end of his profession. None of them knew of the effort required to maintain

gear put away. If any member of his section was responsible for night instruction their chief was always on hand to supervise through to the end.

The force of this kind of unstinting offering of time to duty was the biggest reason why his instructors were never late for the beginning of their instruction and never secured the instruction before the scheduled hour without permission. Most Marines are willing to give a full day's work and more if they can observe this same willingness on the part of their leader. Being a leader means that you must get on the job first and be the last to leave.

We have been told that the last step in the preparation stage in the technique of military instruction is to check final arrangements. In the type of field instruction that we were

responsible for, the arrangement for the proper logistical support was extremely important. Although all sections responsible for this support were on the distribution list for the training schedule and their support was routine, our subject was not satisfied with this arrangement. Late in the afternoon of the day prior to the scheduled instruction he would contact all support sections involved and insure that the support was being arranged for and would be there on time. This daily check was annoying to some section heads who were generally conscientious about the proper performance of their duties, but quite frequently it prompted other parties who weren't so conscientious to get on the ball and thereby avoided the loss of instruction time or obviated the possibility of second rate instruction resulting from improper logistical support. Here again we note the benefits derived from expending a little extra energy in leadership.

To my knowledge no one was ever known to observe our subject when

he needed a haircut or was not in a clean, freshly pressed uniform whether it was the service uniform or utility. There is no doubt that this constant squared-away appearance cost the owner some added expense and trouble but, as we all know, it is much easier for the leader to require his men to be squared-away if he is always the squared-away model Marine himself. The observance of this, the fifth principle of leadership — set the example, in connection with a squared-away appearance — bears instant fruit. It goes without saying that our subject's section was the most squared-away of any unit in the regiment.

Moral force and moral energy are related because we expend moral energy to dispel moral force. Our subject had moral force in connec-


echelon personnel section, who whisked him out from under us, was his status as a Staff NCO saved.

Our subject was expending the moral energy necessary to prevent his section from becoming second-rate by allowing a shoddy performance on the part of a Staff NCO who was of doubtful value to the Marine Corps but, nevertheless, quite likeable and popular in the higher places.

The third principle of leadership has to do with looking out for the welfare of your men. Many of us make the proper inquiries and take the proper initial action when in the process of squaring away our men's problems, but some of us lose momentum when obstructed by delay or difficulty. Not so with our subject. Once he decided that one of his men was not getting what he rated and that it was the section chief's job to get it for him, he followed through. Then if he was blocked at a certain level he would circumvent that level and go higher, nor would delays put him off. He would wait a reasonable length of time and then strike again. More than one felt the sting of reprimand from the high places because our subject would not brook shoddy handling of his men's welfare. The energy expended in this aspect of leadership paid dividends in the men's stellar performance of their duties as instructors. Marines will work and fight for leaders who work and fight for them.


In some positions of leadership a leader with some know-how and considerable ability as a diplomat and politician can get by, but the leader who wants to do an outstanding job will have to be prepared to do a lot of work. There is no substitute for energy in leadership. In these days if you are not willing to put out that extra bit of energy you are going to find others, who are willing to work, catching up with you and passing you by with earned promotions. *It's up to you.* USMC


tion with the supervision of the men of his section. During my observation an antiquated, good-Joe-type Staff NCO of doubtful dependability was assigned his section. Many conjectures were offered as to whether or not our subject would tolerate the vagaries of the good-Joe-type Staff NCO whose respect for punctuality was somewhat lacking. Those who were wondering what the outcome of this situation would be, were not long in waiting, for the first time this Staff NCO was late for a class even though he was only an assistant, he was up before the "Man." It appeared for awhile that the warning he received was enough to get him in line, but several weeks later he was delinquent again and this time he was the primary instructor. Only because our undependable individual had a friend in a high



By MSgt C. V. Crumb

LEADERSHIP





the Campaign
in the Crimea
1941-42

By Fieldmarshal von Manstein

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With the bugaboo existing in the Free World today — the spectre of a possible clash with the Soviet Union and her tremendous manpower supported by heavy armor and modern air — this campaign is worth professional study in many ways.

First, we see how a commander, with no armor and lacking continual air support defeated an enemy in detail who was not only numerically superior, but also had great strength in armor, prepared positions to fight from, command of the air and control of the sea.

Further, the campaign was waged over most difficult terrain on two fronts against a unified enemy who could reinforce at will.

Considering that the commander accomplished this amazing feat with a combined force — part of which composed an allied army poorly trained and ill equipped — is a tribute to skillful leadership and sound planning.

Finally, it is significant to note that even back as far as 1941-42, the Soviet military establishment was capable of mounting an amphibious operation in over 2-division strength and effecting a landing.

This article was prepared by the author especially for the GAZETTE. He condensed it from his book, *Lost Victories* (Athenaem Press, Bad Godesberg). The translation was done by Capt H. W. Henzel and this is its first publication in this country.

THE ERA OF THE MASS ARMIES brought with it a method of control that, in general, narrowly limited the independence of those army groups and armies at the front in so far as it concerned the conduct of their own operations. They became links of a chain, which spanned the entire theater of operations. Each of these links was dependent upon the next one, and altogether they could operate only within the limits set for them by the highest command.

In view of this, a campaign in which a single army could still operate independently in an isolated theater of operations should prove exceptionally interesting. This was the case in Crimea in 1941/42 — where such an army was dependent on itself alone, and also spared the interference from the highest command. This campaign, from the fall of 1941 until July of 1942, was an uninterrupted series of heavy major engagements — mostly against a superior enemy. A battle, which began on two fronts, led to a sweeping pursuit which swept the enemy from the Crimean Peninsula and first came to a halt before the walls of Sevastopol. This was the result of an encirclement on one front and two penetrations on the second. The struggle, which continued with the first attack on this fortress until the landing of far superior enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula, forced the campaign to a halt and led to a crisis in which the fate of the German Eleventh Army hung by a silk thread. Then, after more heavy defensive battles on this new second front, a complete victory of annihilation was achieved and the campaign for the seizure of Sevastopol was brought to its victorious end.

For those interested in military history, it might be tempting to compare it with the Crimean War of the last century when the same historical names appeared. This involved the same prize — the seizure of the land and sea fortress of Sevastopol. But there was a basic difference in the strategic situation.

In the Crimean War from 1854/56 the attacking Western powers had

control of the sea and could use it to good advantage. But in the Crimean campaign of 1941/42, the control of the Black Sea lay in the hands of the Russians. The attacking German Eleventh Army had not only to conquer the Crimea and Sevastopol, but, at the same time, had to counter the advantages which control of the seas gave to the Soviets.

The Situation at the End of September 1941

When the author took over the command of the Eleventh Army on 17 September 1941 as successor to Col Gen von Schobert (who had been killed in action) he found the following situation: The southern flank of the German Eastern Front was involved in the pursuit of the retreating enemy eastward along the northern coast of the Black Sea through the Nogai Steppe.

Originally, the army group to which the German Eleventh Army, as well as the Third and Fourth Rumanian Armies belonged, had been formed by the Rumanian leader, Marshal Antonescu. The Marshal himself took control of and ordered the Fourth Rumanian Army to attack the fortress Odessa, held by strong Soviet forces. The Eleventh Army was put under the command of Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt's Army Group South advancing farther to the North. At the same time, the Third Rumanian Army was made subordinate to the Eleventh Army. Hence, it became necessary to lead an allied army as well as a German one—a difficult task. The fact that attendant difficulties could be surmounted was attributable primarily to the loyalty of Marshal Antonescu. No matter what one's opinions are of him as a politician, he was a most dependable ally and a good soldier. The commander of the Third Rumanian Army, ColGen Dumitrescu, also made the co-ordination considerably easier because of his loyal recognition of the German command.

The command over the military forces of a coalition always demands considerable tact and understanding for the peculiarities or weaknesses of an ally despite complete loyalty on both sides. Especially, if in critical situations such weaknesses inevitably force an interference with the



Marshal Antonescu—his loyalty eased problems of an allied command

leadership of that ally. The Third Rumanian Army, now under the Eleventh Army command, was at that time no longer qualified for offensive action; and for the defense only if reinforced by German units. This condition was traceable to shortcomings of the inner structure of the Rumanian Army; and therein lies the reason for their excessively high casualties in past battles. The Rumanian soldier—coming mostly from a peasant environment and accustomed to a scanty subsistence—basically is willing, easily satisfied and, under taut leadership, also brave. But such leadership was frequently lacking. The officers' corps had not been trained in that inherent spirit of obligation to duty and the care and consideration for their men, nor did they have the initiative

indoctrinated into the officers of the German Army. Additionally, their training—based on French principles since the First World War—was not sufficient for the requirements of a war of movement. Above all, a lack of initiative and resourcefulness was noticeable among the subordinate leaders as well as the individual soldiers. The improvement of these conditions was hindered by widespread illiteracy. Then, too, their troops lacked the backbone of a long-service NCO corps. Lastly, their weapons and equipment were completely inadequate, especially for antitank defense, for at that time the Rumanian Army did not even have any armored units. Finally, one dare not overlook the hypnosis with which all the Balkan folk are afflicted in a

Rumanian troops—brave, but lacking in training and leadership



battle with the Soviet Union: the tremendous respect for "Great Russia!"

These weaknesses had to be set in the proper perspective by the German command if they did not want to be disappointed while employing Rumanian forces. Nevertheless, the Rumanian troops did their duty within the scope of their capabilities. Moreover, it would be a fatal mistake to assume that the previously mentioned shortcomings were unalterable. With this usable military manpower, very valuable troop units could be built; if training and equipment would meet modern requirements; if the general level of education could be raised; and if, above all, the officers' corps was so trained that it would be able to handle its assignments.

So we came to the last third of September when the operational situation was as follows:

The German Eleventh Army had forced the crossing over the lower Dnepr at Berislav. Its main strength (the XXX Corps and the IL Mountain Corps) was pursuing a retreating enemy toward the east along the northern shore of the Black Sea generally in the direction of the Sea of Azov on the already fortified Melitopol-Nikopol line. The LIV Corps had been turned off to the south in order to open the approaches to the Crimea, into which part of the enemy had retreated. The Third Rumanian Army, composed of one cavalry and one mountain corps, still stood west of the Dnepr. Obviously, the Rumanians were not at all eager to advance any further into the interior of Russia after they had secured their expected war aim — the reoccupation of Bessarabia.

This situation was propagated further by the overemphasis the German High Command placed on recent military victories. They believed that the Eleventh Army could be assigned two missions in two divergent directions. First, the continuation of the pursuit through the Nogai Steppe to the east and on to Rostov; second, the conquest of the Crimea, upon which a special value was laid since the peninsula, in Soviet hands, created a danger to the open flank of the German southern flank as well as an air base from which to originate attacks on the Rumanian oilfields.

The Eleventh Army command had to decide which of the two tasks it wanted to assign priority. It decided on Crimea. The two corps presently engaged in the pursuit to the east would not be sufficient for such a far-reaching operation by themselves — as had been planned for Rostov — since it was to be assumed that as soon as the enemy was in the fortified line Melitopol-Nikopol he would bring up new forces to this front. On the other hand, it was not to be expected that the LIV Corps alone would be enough

(the principal approach into the Crimea) changes were shaping up on the Eastern Front. The enemy had established prepared positions on the Melitopol-Nikopol front — the pursuit had to be instituted.

On 24 September the LIV Corps (3 divisions) commenced the attack on the Isthmus of Perekop over flat plains which did not render any cover, which the enemy had transformed into a defensive system 15 km deep and which was impossible to bypass because of the Black Sea on one side and the salt swamp of



Perekop defenses — 15 km deep, over open terrain from sea to sea

to fight its way into Crimea and seize and occupy the entire peninsula, including the fortress of Sevastopol. Additionally, the High Command then wanted one corps to cross the Straits of the Kerch in order to continue in the direction of the Caucasus.


Because of that, the Eleventh Army command pulled the mountain corps out of the group which was pursuing eastward so as to make it available for combat on the Crimea. In its place a third Rumanian division was to be substituted, which would be reinforced by a division from the German corps. Meanwhile, the Rumanian cavalry corps was to be absorbed into the German corps.

Battle on Two Fronts

Starting on 21 September while the shifting of forces took place and while the LIV Corps prepared to attack the narrow neck of Perekop

Sivash on the other. In spite of this, the corps succeeded in taking Perekop by the 26th of September and in crossing the deep Tartar Moat (dating back to ancient times) which cuts through the isthmus. In 3 more days of heavy attack the remainder of the deep enemy defensive zone was penetrated. The enemy retreated further south to the Isthmus of Ishun in which he had concentrated new strength. In doing this, he left behind 11,000 prisoners, 112 tanks and 135 pieces of artillery. As a result, the fruit of victory, the final breakthrough on to the Crimea could not yet be plucked. The intention of the Army commander to employ the IL Mountain Corps at this point had been nullified by the enemy.

On 26 September a Russian offensive was launched against the Eastern Front with two new armies (the Eighteenth and the Ninth) in order



The drive to the sea of Azov and breakthrough on the Isthmus of Perekop

to prevent our advance into Crimea. Serious crises arose in the Rumanian units which held that sector. South of the Dnepr the enemy breakthrough was already tantamount to being a success—however, he did not take advantage of the opportunities which were afforded him. Our reaction was unavoidable. The IL Mountain Corps, already advancing into Crimea had to counterattack in order to re-establish the situation. The immediate continuation of the attack on the Crimea, therefore, had to be postponed.

But there was a possibility of turning this crisis into a great success. The two enemy armies attacking here had lost all forward movement and were at a standstill. They lacked the reserves to cover the Dnepr crossings at Zaporzhe and Dnepropetrovsk to the north. Out of the German army groups engaged, von Rundstedt ordered Pan-

zer Group I of General von Kleist to lead a drive into the enemy's northern flank, while the Eleventh Army simultaneously resumed the attack again. The battle ended with the encirclement of the main forces of both enemy armies north of the Sea of Azov. Over 65,000 prisoners, 125 tanks and 500 pieces of artillery fell into German hands.

The Conquest of Crimea

With the conclusion of the Battle of the Sea of Azov, the *Oberkommando des Heeres* ordered a redeployment of forces. The continuation of the advance on Rostov was to be taken over by Panzer Group I, to which was transferred the IL Mountain Corps and the motorized *Leibstandarte* (SS division) from the Eleventh Army.

To the Eleventh Army fell the sole task of conquering the Crimea. Two corps remained with it (the

XXX Corps with the 22d, 72d, 170th Infantry Divisions and the LIV Corps with the 46th, 73d and 50th Infantry Divisions). The Third Rumanian Army was only to take over the defense of the coast of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. In spite of this, we succeeded in reaching an agreement with Marshal Antonescu that the headquarters of the Rumanian Mountain Corps with one mountain and one cavalry brigade would follow us into Crimea. The headquarters of the 42d, 24th and 132d Infantry Divisions were transferred to the Eleventh Army.

First of all it was necessary to open the approach to Crimea through the isthmus of Perekop—again an attack through a well-developed field fortifications system. The terrain (barren salt steppes) did not permit any covered approach whatsoever; and any possibility of an encirclement on either flank was

eliminated by the sea. Despite the fact that the German assault artillery was superior to that of the Soviets the (then) 6 divisions of the Eleventh Army were confronted by 8 Soviet rifle divisions and 4 cavalry divisions. The enemy had evacuated Odessa by the middle of October, after the Rumanians' unsuccessful attacks, and had brought the army which was fighting there, over the sea to Crimea. In addition to this, the enemy controlled the air completely. This was true until finally the newly assigned fighter squadron of Moelder's swept the skies clean of the incessant attacks of the enemy bombers.

This attack turned into a struggle for every step forward—an alarming drain on the offensive power of our divisions which, after 7 days of attack, really seemed to be exhausted. It was the time, which always comes once in a struggle such as this, in which the fate of the battle is bal-

anced, so to speak, on the keen edge of the blade. This hour must prove that the will of the attacker, by giving his utmost, is stronger than the will of the defender to resist. The outcome of the struggle depends on the spiritual determination of the leader. But even his forcefulness would be in vain were it not for the determination and will of the troops never to hesitate.


The command of the Eleventh Army was not willing to let the victory slip in the last minute because of weakness. The heroic battle spirit of our soldiers also overcame the vicious resistance of the enemy. After another day of heavy fighting, 27 October brought the decision. On 28 October the Soviet defense collapsed and the Eleventh Army could move on to the exploitation phase.

The vanquished proved himself to be faster than the victor. The possibility of finding safety some-

where in the rear accelerates the retreat. At the same time those in retreat always have the opportunity to hold up the forces in pursuit by rear-guard actions and thereby gain precious time for their main forces. Then, too, in his hour of success the victor is always subject to a let-down after the extreme effort of the all-out drive which is asked of him for the successful assault. The history of war has only a few examples of pursuits which resulted in the annihilation of the enemy. For in order to accomplish this goal, it is imperative to overtake the enemy and to reach decisive points ahead of him.

To the defeated enemy on the northern shore of the Crimea the following courses of action were open. He could try to move back to the south, perpendicularly, to reach the dominating Yaila Mountains of the southern part of Crimea, and there continue the battle. He could strive to save part of his forces in

Breakthrough at Ishun and seizure of the Crimean Peninsula



the strong fortress of Sevastopol, or at another strong point on the eastern extension of Crimea—the Kerch Peninsula—whose defense could be made possible by the highly developed positions on the Isthmus of Parpatsch. If both succeeded, then he would occupy two corner bastions on the Crimea out of which, with control of the sea, he could take the offensive at any time. Indeed it seemed that the enemy wanted to pull his Coastal Army (5 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions) back in the direction of the capital city Simferopol, and defend the Kerch Peninsula with his IX Corps (4 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions). Consequently it was necessary for the Eleventh Army to take the lead in securing 3 points before the enemy: It had to prevent him from gaining a defensive foothold on the Kerch Peninsula at the Isthmus of Parpatsch. As fast as possible, they had to drive to the mountains as far as Simferopol and, from there, on to the south coast in order to frustrate any attempt of the enemy to again establish himself on the northern boundary of the mountains. Finally a rapid advance on Sevastopol would prevent that part of the enemy from escaping into the fortress.

As a result, the newly arrived Command Group 42 with 3 divisions was assigned the mission of pursuit in the direction of the harbor of Feodosiya and the Kerch Peninsula. The XXX Corps was sent with 2 divisions in direction of Simferopol, the keypoint of the only good road-net which was to be found in the southern part of Crimea. To the LIV Corps with 2 divisions (the 132d InfDiv was newly assigned) and a newly organized motor brigade was given the mission of pursuit in the direction of Sevastopol.

The attempt of the enemy to establish a front on the Isthmus of Parpatsch was denied by Command Group 42, and with the rapid seizure of the harbor of Feodosiya the embarkation of sizeable enemy forces was prevented. On 15 November with the seizure of the city of Kerch, the Peninsula had fallen too. Only insignificant elements of the enemy had escaped across the Straits of Kerch.

With unceasing pressure the XXX Corps quickly secured the keypoint




Highway to Alushta—control of the key road nets a tactical necessity

of Simferopol and, by further drives through the mountains to the southern coast, was able to split the main forces of the enemy in two. The enemy group which had been pushed into the mountains east of the Simferopol-Alushta highway was annihilated. The enemy elements west of the aforementioned highway were cut off from their retreat on the highway running alongside the southern coast to Sevastopol. At the same time the LIV Corps had occupied the highway which led to Sevastopol along the northern edge of the mountains ahead of schedule. The only chance for the enemy elements, pushed into the mountains between the two corps, was to try to escape on mountain paths into the fortress, leaving behind all heavy equipment. It was beyond German capabilities to prevent this.

As for the attempt to take the fortress by surprise, the Eleventh Army command unfortunately had to desist. It would have required a fast unit, which would have had to advance far in front of the LIV Corps which was then advancing against the fortress. The only motorized unit over which the army had had control ("Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler") had been taken away at the end of the battle on the Sea of Azov (as has been pointed out earlier) and had been assigned to Panzer Group Kleist advancing on Rostov. The motorized unit formed by the Eleventh Army as an auxiliary, mostly made up of Rumanian troops, was not suited to carrying out a surprise attack on the fortress.

Despite the fact that the pursuit of the enemy could not be crowned by the seizure of the fortress of

Southern Coast—rugged route to Feodosiya



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Sevastopol, it nearly led to the annihilation of the enemy in the field. Our 6 divisions had chewed up 2 enemy armies, with the total of 12 rifle and 4 cavalry divisions. From a total combat strength of about 200,000 men, the enemy lost in the battle for the isthmus and in the wake of our advance over 100,000 men captured along with about 700 pieces of artillery, 160 tanks and at least 35,000 killed. Those who were able to save themselves over the Kerch Strait or into Sevastopol were stragglers without heavy weapons. If it was possible to again reorganize and re-equip these elements in the fortress together with the fortress troops, the enemy could credit this to the control of the sea. This naval capability made it possible for him to reinforce and resupply Sevastopol at the right time.

The First Attack on Sevastopol

Since the surprise seizure of Sevastopol was not possible during the pursuit phase and because of a lack of mechanized units, it now was essential to take the fortress as soon as possible by sheer force of arms. Day by day the defenses became stronger and the danger increased that the Soviets, while the mass of the Eleventh Army was tied down at Sevastopol, would land somewhere in the rear with fresh forces along the vast and only weakly secured coasts of Crimea. A quick success against the fortress would require the assignment of all the German divisions of the Eleventh Army to the attack. This was necessary in view of the fact that enemy strength was augmented by the terrain and the countless fortifications. Also by the fact that they had troops whose combat effectiveness could be very quickly renewed and which soon grew to an army of 9 divisions. The Eleventh Army command had to accept the risk and leave Command Group 42 with the 46th Infantry Division on Kerch Peninsula which was most exposed to an enemy landing. A Rumanian cavalry brigade was to secure the remaining eastern coast. A Rumanian mountain brigade had to be assigned to combat the partisans in Yaila Mountains to insure that the most important axes of supply were held open.

For the conduct of the attack the most important thing was the



Sevastopol area—the advantage lay with the defender

urgency to win control of the harbor of Sevastopol and the Severnaya Bight as soon as possible. As long as the enemy had the capability to obtain reinforcement and materiel for the fortress from over the sea, it was not possible to foresee a quick success with the forces distributed as they were. The Luftwaffe, because of the weather conditions in the winter and their reduced strength, was in no position to cut off enemy surface resupply.

This was the fundamental reason why the main attack was launched against the northern front of the defensive sector, whose total extent was 35 km. The terrain also favored this solution. The proposed zone of action in the north included the deeply cut-up Belbek Valley, and the area between this and Severnaya Bight was heavily fortified in particular. However, it was comparatively open in contrast to the eastern sector, whose northern portion was covered with an almost impene-

trable growth of thickets while in the south a rugged range of rocky mountains stood in the way. The effectiveness of the assault artillery could also be most heavily brought to bear in the north. The resupply of ammunition to the greater part of the artillery through the Yaila Mountains in the southern sector would have been impossible—not to mention the fact that here the main artery of supply, which ran along the length of the southern coast, could have been taken under fire by the Red Fleet at any time.

The Army command therefore ordered the main attack from the north by the LIV Corps with 4 infantry divisions and the greater part of the heavy artillery. It was planned to have another division in reserve for this attack. The crisis at Rostov, however, forced Army Group South to pull this division out of the Crimea. That the reserve for the northern attack was gone, later proved to be a decisive factor. A holding at-



Ft Maxim Gorki I—380mm batteries on the northern sector

tack in the southern portion of the eastern sector was to be conducted by XXX Corps with 2 infantry divisions.

The earliest possible time for the attack had been set at 27 November—this in view of the necessity to bring the divisions over from the Kerch Peninsula and, under already difficult supply conditions, to replenish and supply the assault artillery with ammunition. Then "General Winter" cancelled our plans. Heavy frosts on the mainland, ice jams on the Dnepr, and roads made completely unpassable by rain in north and central Crimea caused the supply columns to be bogged down. Therefore the attack was delayed till 17 December. This gain of time was of great benefit to the defending army in the fortress which was not dependent upon rails and roads. The danger of a Soviet landing grew.

This first attack on Sevastopol did not result in the hoped-for success, although the northern group did succeed in making a deep penetration in the enemy defenses between Belbek Valley and the Severnaya Bight. By the end of December, the point of the ever-diminishing attacking wedge had worked itself close to Fort Stalin. One last thrust and the fort with its observation of the Severnaya Bight (and therewith the capability of controlling this body of water with artillery) would have been achieved. For this thrust, however, a reserve the size of the infantry division which had shortly before been withdrawn from Crimea to Rostov was lacking. It was in

this situation that the Army met the Soviet landings first at Kerch and then at Feodosiya. It was obvious that we must throw forces against the threatened points as quickly as possible. In spite of this, the Army made a last attempt to exploit the success on the northern sector of Sevastopol. Could this be achieved, then it would be possible to free more forces for the attack against the new enemy, instead of taking the pressure off the enemy at Sevastopol earlier. But the combat elements of the attacking divisions were exhausted. The Army command had at first ordered only the cessation of the southern attack in order to be able to shift one of the two divisions there to the eastern part of Crimea. But by 30 December the northern attack had to be halted also in order to free more units here. Moreover, the withdrawal of the attacking units to the northern bank of the Belbek River was essential. After all the sacrifices and accomplishments of the troops this was a painful decision for the Army commander. Nevertheless, here as in the south, more favorable points of departure were attained for a future attack. Yet this was little consolation.

The Stalin Offensive for the Recapture of Crimea


New Year's 1941/42 was the beginning of a period in which the fate of the German Army of the Crimea would hang by a silk thread. It proved that the Soviet landings were not only a relief for the hard-pressed Sevastopol but a large well-planned offensive, which, as the Soviet radio

announced, was ordered by Stalin himself and would not come to an end until the last German was eliminated from Crimea. As a matter of fact, within a short time two powerful Soviet armies on the Kerch Peninsula attempted, together with the army occupying Sevastopol, to achieve the annihilation of the Eleventh Army.

On 26 December the enemy landed with two divisions on each side of the city of Kerch. Smaller landing attempts followed on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. In the next few days Command Group 42 with the 46th Inf Div succeeded in reducing the beachheads to a few small pockets of stragglers. Units had to be brought up to Kerch which were assigned to the security of the port of Feodosiya—located on the south coast of Crimea at the neck of the Kerch Peninsula—before the replacements ordered by the Army command (the Rumanian mountain brigade) could be brought in.

In the night of 29 December the enemy initiated another blow. Under the protection of heavy naval forces he landed at Feodosiya and seized the city and the harbor. Command Group 42 thereupon ordered the 46th Inf Div to evacuate the Kerch Peninsula. In the course of their withdrawal they lost almost all of their artillery since the icy roads prevented it from being moved. The enemy at Kerch, however, now was unhindered in its pursuit of this division. The Straits of Kerch froze and allowed the enemy to transport more units to the Peninsula. At the same time the counterattack of the newly arrived Rumanian units, which had been ordered by the Army command the morning after the landing at Feodosiya, failed. The Rumanians retreated before the Soviet tanks as far back as Sary-Krym.

Had the enemy acted quickly and decisively, he could not only have cut off the German division coming back from Kerch at Parpatsch, but also driven on to reach the main artery of the Eleventh Army—the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railroad—and thereby prevent any reinforcement and resupply. But the Soviets failed to use the grace of the hour. Only hesitantly did they follow



The coastline—west of Feodosiya

from Kerch and probe from Feodosiya. This made it possible to build up an extremely thin defensive line between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov in the vicinity of Stary-Krym. It consisted of the depleted 46th Inf Div, the Rumanians, into whose units soldiers from the staff of the Army headquarters were assigned, and a regiment of the 73d Inf Div which had been set in march toward Rostov and could just be stopped in time at the northern exit from Crimea. In spite of the fact that two Soviet armies soon stood before this thin defensive veil, the enemy still hesitated. However, 14 critical days still had to pass, until those units, pulled out by the Army command from the Sevastopol front (the XXX Corps with 2 infantry divisions) could be committed at Feodosiya. New dangers arose. On 5 January, a new landing of Soviet units was launched, covered by naval elements, on the western coast of Crimea at the port of Eupatoria. At the same time, an uprising arose in that city whose instigators were mostly infiltrated partisans. The most forward regiment of the forces assigned to Feodosiya, together with other hastily assembled units, had to put down this new danger. In heavy street fighting they succeeded in annihilating the enemy landing force as well as 1,200 armed partisans. At the same time the enemy attacked out of the fortress of Sevastopol in order to break our encirclement, which now was only manned by 4 divisions. We succeeded in throwing back the attacks.

Finally on 15 January the situa-

tion was such that the Eleventh Army could strike against Feodosiya. In a 3-day battle the enemy was defeated and the city and harbor recaptured. Remaining in German hands were 10,000 prisoners, 127 pieces of artillery and 85 tanks. But the German units, which now consisted only of $3\frac{1}{3}$ depleted infantry divisions and one Rumanian mountain brigade, were not sufficient to completely drive an enemy whose strength was 8 divisions and 2 brigades, off the Kerch Peninsula. So the Army command had to be content with winning back the Parpatsch neck, thereby sealing off the Peninsula. That the Soviets were not satisfied with this defeat was obvious. Three times, with far superior forces, they launched attempts to break through the neck, while other strong forces, for which there no longer was any room in the first attack wave, stood ready in the

second line. These were to exploit the breakthrough with a quick, deep drive, which would seal the fate of the Eleventh Army, should the initial penetration be successful. Each of these offensives on the Parpatsch front was aided by attacks of the Army occupying Sevastopol, which (in comparison to the 3 German divisions and 1 Rumanian Mountain Brigade surrounding the fortress) consisted of 7 rifle divisions, 3 brigades of marines and a dismounted cavalry division.

The first major Soviet attack on the Parpatsch front lasted from 27 February to 3 March. There now stood on that defensive front—in addition to the previously mentioned $3\frac{1}{3}$ divisions—another newly arrived Rumanian division. The enemy attacked with 7 rifle divisions, 2 brigades and several tank battalions (we had no tanks!) in the first wave, while an additional 6-7 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades and 1 cavalry division stood ready in second line to exploit the breakthrough. It almost seemed that the enemy would succeed in this. The Rumanian division on the northern flank of our position was overrun. Only with the commitment of the last German reserves was it possible to stem the enemy breakthrough farther back.

On 3 March a pause resulting from exhaustion finally set in. Despite the fact that we had succeeded in frustrating the enemy breakthrough, the deep penetration in the Rumanian sector created such a wide salient in our defensive positions that from then on it continued to be a dangerous spot.

Feodosiya—the Soviets failed to exploit their successful landing



The enemy commenced his second offensive on 18 March, this time with 8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades in the first wave. In heavy fighting it was again repulsed. The regiments of a German division against which the enemy main drive was directed, had repulsed 22 attacks. Above all, it also seemed that their defensive stamina had been exhausted. It was questionable if they could ward off a new major attack now being prepared. In this critical situation the Army command decided to lead a surprise counterattack with a newly organized Panzer division which had just been assigned by the OKH. By this attack we hoped to remove the aforementioned deep salient from our front and also be able to cut off the enemy units within the pocket. The attack failed. This division did not yet have the necessary training and combat experience. In spite of this, it gave the enemy a shock which allowed us time to catch our breath. This fruitless attack against the Russian front which was widely bowed to the west was nevertheless to prove of some value later.

As a last effort, on 9 April the third enemy offensive was launched against the Parpatsch front, in order to win back Crimea. As before, this offensive was supported by sorties out from the garrison at Sevastopol. It also collapsed with heavy losses to the attacker. Therewith, after 3 days of battle, the Soviet offensive power in this sector had been exhausted. The Eleventh Army had overcome the ominous and deadly danger of being cut off in Crimea by an enemy breakthrough at the Parpatsch neck. We could commence preparing for the counter-offensives which should then finally drive the enemy out of Crimea and out of Sevastopol.

Operation "Bustard Hunt"

The Soviets in the meantime had gathered together all the units which were fighting in Crimea under a command they called the "Crimea Front." These were the Coastal Army in Sevastopol with 7 rifle divisions, 3 brigades and 1 cavalry division as well as the Fifty-first and Forty-fourth Armies on the Kerch front. These last two had at their disposal over 17 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades, 2 cavalry divisions



The hard-pressed Parpatsch Front held under the Stalin offensive

and 4 tank brigades, a total of 26 units of considerable size. They therefore continued to present the greatest danger to the German Eleventh Army. How was one to dispose of these vastly superior forces?

There was no other choice but to again weaken our encircling front around Sevastopol by one German division, which was to be replaced by a newly arrived Rumanian one. That we had to take an extraordinary risk by leaving only 3 German and 1 Rumanian divisions before Sevastopol could not be avoided if we still wanted to take the offensive on the Kerch Peninsula.

There, in addition to the 3½ German divisions and one Rumanian division, as well as the already mentioned Panzer division on the Parpatsch front, we had at our disposal one Jaeger division which the OKH had assigned us and one Rumanian infantry division which was transferred to us by Marshal Antonescu. Nevertheless, after a recapitulation of the units, the proportion still stood at 3 to 1 for the enemy. As a trump, it is true, we had very powerful assault artillery

brought up from Sevastopol as well as the VIII Air Corps, the strongest close support unit in our Luftwaffe, and whose commander (later Field-marshal von Richthofen) was the best air commander the Germans had.

In the face of the proportioned forces, a German offensive on the Kerch Peninsula was a very difficult undertaking. Again it involved an attack on a very heavily fortified position—one which had the sea on both flanks—thereby eliminating any possibility of encirclement.

There were two conditions, which, in spite of our numerical inferiority, appeared to give us a chance. The first was that the Russians, because of the great number of their units could only employ a part of them at the front—simply because there was not room for any more. If we succeeded in effectively engaging the enemy in the constricture of the isthmus, his freedom of operational movement would be substantially reduced. In no case should we permit him to withdraw to the east in the considerably wider part of the peninsula, where simultaneously and effectively he could bring the superior

The author ('scope) and von Richthofen (peaked cap) at Kerch front



number of his units to bear against us.

The second favorable condition was that the Soviets—as already mentioned earlier—had thrown back the Rumanians on the northern flank during their first major attack on the Parpatsch Peninsula so that here they occupied an extended bulge to the west. Against this, as reported, an unsuccessful attack had been made by our Panzer division. Since that time the Russians obviously suspected this position to be imperiled. Not only did they reinforce this over-extended bulge more strongly than the southern sector of the Parpatsch position, but they also concentrated their reserves behind this northern flank.

It was on this enemy situation that the German attack plans were predicated. It had the covername "Bustard Hunt"—after a large bird which was hunted on the Crimean steppe.

The plan of attack was as follows: to deceive the enemy at the spot where he was most likely to expect an attack (on the northern flank or in the middle of the front) by preparations for offensive action, or by holding attacks. This assignment fell to the Rumanian command group in the north with 2 divisions and a cavalry brigade; in the center to Command Group 42 with 2 German divisions. The decisive drive, however, was the responsibility of the XXX Corps in the south with 3 German infantry divisions and the only Panzer division. The infantry divisions had to penetrate the heavily fortified Parpatsch position, supported by the VIII Air Corps, and then seize territory to the east in order to make possible the advance of the Panzer division over the very deeply dug antitank ditch. Thereafter, XXX Corps, with the Panzers in the lead, was to swing to the north to trap the main forces of the enemy on and behind the northern flank by striking them in the flank and in the rear, then forcing them against the northern coast and here encircle them. A specially organized fast brigade—without considerations as to what was happening on their flanks—had to drive east in the direction of Kerch after their breakthrough of the Parpatsch position. In any case, it was imperative that they anticipate the attempt of



Pioneers blast through the AT ditch in the Parpatsch position


the enemy to establish a front in a prepared secondary position halfway towards Kerch. A battalion, ferried across the sea in assault boats, and landed in the rear of the enemy, was the supporting unit for the decisive attack of the XXX Corps. This was probably the first time that assault boats were ever employed on the open sea. Naturally everything was predicated upon deceptive measures to hide from the enemy the actual intentions and to confirm his belief that our attack undoubtedly would be directed against his overextended bulge, as had been done earlier with the employment of the Panzer division.

The offensive was conducted according to this plan. The assault was launched on 8 May. In heavy fighting the XXX Corps, effectively supported by the VIII Air Corps, succeeded in breaking through the enemy position. Yet the Panzer division could not be moved across the antitank ditch until 9 May. As it swung to the north, it was immediately engaged in a counterattack by powerful Soviet tank units. Then it began to rain, which resulted in the

Panzer division being stuck in the Russian mud (clay) for almost 24 hours. Since, in this operation, everything was dependent upon surprising the enemy through speed of movement, this loss of time could be fatal. Fortunately, the fast brigade described earlier had advanced far to the east before the rains set in so that it was able to frustrate every attempt of the enemy to build up a defense line farther to the rear. In addition, the enemy had still not realized our intentions. His reserves stood, as before, behind his northern flank. From 11 May on, the operation ran according to plan. In its thrust to the north, the Panzer division reached the coast. About 8 enemy divisions found themselves trapped in this pocket. The remainder of the enemy was annihilated during the exploitation and pursuit and in the fighting on the coasts of Kerch Straits. On 16 May the city of Kerch was seized and on 18 May the battle for the Kerch Peninsula was ended. We captured about 170,000 prisoners, 1,133 pieces of artillery and 258 tanks. Both enemy armies could be considered

VIII Air Corps executes effective support against Soviet tanks





Battle for the Kerch Peninsula

annihilated. Only a few had been fortunate enough to escape over the Kerch Straits. By deceiving and surprising the enemy, we had succeeded in achieving an overpowering success by a frontal penetration and encircling operation. The victory was not one of superior numbers, but must be attributed to the initiative of the leaders in all grades and in the superior combat ability of the troops.

Operation "Sturgeon Haul"

Immediately after the conclusion of the battle, the German forces

commenced the movement to the Sevastopol front. Only Command Group 42 with one division as well as the Rumanian units, remained on the Kerch Peninsula to secure it and the southern coast. The Panzer division had to be released for the impending major offensive on the mainland.

The aspects for the planning of the attack on Sevastopol were the same as those for the winter attack: the main attack was to be launched from the north in order to gain control of the harbor as soon as possible and because only in the north-

ern zone of action could the superiority of the assault artillery be brought to bear with its fullest effectiveness.

The northern attack again was the responsibility of the LIV Corps, this time with 4½ divisions.

The southern attack was to be conducted by the XXX Corps with 3 divisions.

Between both assault groups the Rumanian corps with one infantry division and one (later two) mountain brigades, was inserted.

Besides the superior combat efficiency of our infantry and combat engineers, we had two trumps to play.

The first was a powerful assault artillery. All together, the Eleventh Army had available for the attack over 208 batteries, of which not quite half were of the heavy and heaviest types; there were two special pieces of 600mm caliber and the "Dora" of 820mm. Nevertheless, this assault artillery was not too much considering the total width of the front which was 35km even if, naturally, their effectiveness was to be concentrated against a small zone of action for the attack. In 1945 the Soviet attack plans were based on 250 pieces per kilometer!

The second trump was the VIII Air Corps with its close support

A 210 mm — heavy artillery was a formidable asset



units and heavy flak artillery (also used in ground combat).


The enemy—the Coastal Army—was in its entirety hardly any less in numbers with 7 rifle divisions, 3 brigades and 1 cavalry division. Of course, his artillery was considerably weaker, even if partially protected by armor plate and concrete. He had nothing to match our Luftwaffe units. But instead, the fortifications gave him very strong support—several armored batteries, numerous concrete emplacements and a countless number of small defensive positions built into the rocks. To this add the terrain—in the central sector a dense forest of thickets—in the south rugged and difficult moun-

tains. This indicated that the attack would be a very difficult, bloody and time-consuming struggle for every square foot. Here, at the gates of Sevastopol, there stood not only an attacking army facing an equally strong defender, but also the most modern equipment for artillery and air faced defenses protected by steel, concrete and rocks. Here also was the spirit of the German soldier. The bravery, the initiative and the sacrifice of the German soldiers was pitted against the bitter resistance of an enemy favored by the terrain, and who had the endurance and the unshakeable firmness of the Russian soldier, braced by the iron coercion of the Soviet system!

It is not possible herein to portray the drama of this struggle which went on for about a month without a break during a time of intensely hot weather, or to even do justice to the performance and endurance of the attacker as well as the defender. Only its most important aspects can be covered.

Early on 7 June the infantry attacked on both fronts, supported by an overwhelming delivery of fire by our artillery and bombers. Support consisting of a day-long barrage was given up since the terrain and enemy defenses did not lend itself to this type of preparation; also, munitions for this were not available. Instead, for 5 days we engaged enemy strong-

The complete conquest of Sevastopol





"Dora"—820 mm projectile's entrance . . .



. . . exit



Devastated by "Dora"—North Fort (above)—Maxim Gorki I (below)



Sevastopol aflame—a fortress falls

v Manstein



points and batteries with individual, observed fire missions.

In the first two days of the offensive the LIV Corps crossed the Belbek Valley and pressed on south of it into the deeply echeloned defensive system. The XXX Corps seized points of departure for further attacks. By 17 June the northern wedge of the attack had won observation of the Severnaya Bight. The XXX Corps, in heavy fighting, was able to seize ground on both sides of the highway leading to Sevastopol, then take a row of heavily defended heights and in a surprise drive push on to the foot of the Sapun Heights, key to the entire terrain. Since both corps often shifted the concentration of their artillery preparations along with the changing direction of the infantry's impetus of attack, we succeeded in bringing under our control the entire fortified area north of the Severnaya Bight and the heights of Gajtani by 26 June. In the south, the massive Fedjukiny Heights, stretching out in front of the Sapun Heights, were seized. At the same time both corps were supported on their interior flanks by attacks of the Rumanian mountain corps.

If we had now won the control over the harbor and with it the assumption of final success, the defending enemy army still was not completely defeated. On the northern front they now stood behind the wide Severnaya Bight. On the eastern front they held the heavily fortified heights of Inkerman in addition to the position on the steeply rising Sapun Heights, which extended to the coastal mountains. At the same time the offensive strength of our infantry was almost exhausted. Their regiments numbered less than a hundred men. How were we to bring the battle to a successful end in the southern sector of the fortress, in the city and on the Chersones Peninsula which was protected by more prepared positions? How could another breakthrough against the strong positions on the Sapun Heights and the seizure of the cliffs of Inkerman succeed? A shifting of a division and of the mass of the artillery over the mountains in the southern sector, which appeared to be a preliminary move for success, was not possible without a week-long loss of time. That the enemy, in spite of heavy casualties would fight desperately for

every position, was a certainty.

In this situation, the Army command decided to plan everything upon the assumption that the enemy would be taken by surprise. Against the justified doubts of the commanders involved, it was decided that the LIV Corps would be ordered into the attack by using assault boats to cross the wide Severnaya Bight, in order to lift the Sapun Heights position by the flank. Undoubtedly a great risk, since it was more than questionable, if we would succeed in bringing the assault boats to the water without being observed by the enemy when transporting them over the rock cliffs at the northern shore; and if it was ever possible for them to cross the Bight in the face of the strongly fortified heights on the south shore. At the same time the left wing of the corps was to attack the cliffs of Inkerman from the east. The XXX Corps had to simulate an attack by means of artillery on the broad front against the Sapun Heights, then suddenly break into the position on the Heights on a small front, with the concentration of artillery fires on the point of the breakthrough.

At 0100 on the night of 28/29 June the first wave of 2 divisions of LIV Corps jumped off from the north shore of the Severnaya Bight. Every piece of artillery stood ready to smother the heights on the south shore with murderous fire as soon as our assault boats received any fire from there. However, everything was quiet. The crossing was successful before the enemy realized the danger. The risky jump across the arm of the sea had turned out well.

At first light the left wing of the



Severnaya Bight—assault boats launch the crucial thrust . . .

Corps jumped off against the cliffs of Inkerman. As our infantry reached the foot of this cliff, the earth arose with a terrible detonation. The face of the cliff, about 30 meters high, collapsed along a 300 meter width. In the cliffs, great caverns had been blasted out—formerly used as champagne cellars, but now as ammunition storage. There also, thousands of Russian wounded and civilian refugees had found shelter. Fanatical commissars had blown everything up!

Likewise at first light, XXX Corps had started their assault against the Sapun Heights positions. Supported by the VIII Air Corps they succeeded in securing a small jumping-off point on the ridge line. It could rapidly be expanded by the other divisions following. The enemy apparently gave up the defense of the strong position now outflanked from the north and retreated, still fighting, into the city or to his next position which cut off the Chersones Peninsula from the east. On 1 July, after heavy artillery fire on the positions

at the outskirts of the city, our troops pressed into Sevastopol. The enemy army had evacuated during the night. However, the battle was not yet ended. Obeying the order of Stalin, to fight to the last—perhaps also with the hope that at least a part of the defending army could be evacuated in the countless small and deep inlets of the Chersones Peninsula by the Red Fleet—the Coastal Army fought in innumerable isolated positions which dotted the Chersones Peninsula. At some positions they even attempted to break through our thin lines to the east, probably to gain contact with the partisans in the Yaila Mountains. Finally, the remainder sought refuge in great caverns along the steep banks of the peninsula, waiting in vain for an evacuation from across the sea. When they surrendered on 4 July, 30,000 prisoners alone came out of the remotest points of the peninsula. All together the count of the prisoners in the fortress area was 90,000. The bloody losses of the enemy were multitudinous, compared to ours.

The Crimean Campaign, one of the few campaigns in which an army was still able to conduct independent operations, was at an end. The Eleventh Army had had to overcome serious crises often enough, but they always managed to "pull a victory out of the fire." They had annihilated 4 enemy armies and conquered a fortress, which by construction and surrounding terrain had to be considered as among the strongest of bulwarks. The success can be attributed completely to the bravery and superior efficiency of the German soldier and the initiative of the leaders and the men. USMC

. . . against fortified heights on the south shore



AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY FOR GROUND FORCES

By 1stLt C. H. Strandberg

assigned to VMO-6. 4) Photographic processing, by the 1st MarDiv Photographic and Reproduction Section. 5) Technical Processing by the API Section, G2. 6) Delivery to the requesting unit by the fastest air or ground means available.

We found that a simple ordering system was mandatory. The ultimate user of the photographs has to tell the people who are going to take the pictures exactly what area is to be photographed. They must stipulate the time of day that the pictures should be taken, and whether vertical or oblique pictures are desired. If oblique photography is desired, they should specify the oblique angle desired and the direction in which the camera should be pointed. They should also specify the scale desired.

The major problem is providing photographs having a large enough scale. The image of a jeep at a scale of 1/4,000 is about as long as the thickness of 10 pages of this magazine. Considering that these pictures are going to be studied under poor light, or out of doors, the scale should be larger than 1/4,000.

Overlay requests were best. There was less chance of taking pictures of the wrong area. The principal advantage of the standard request form was that it lent itself to telephonic request use, and since specific questions were asked, requests were more apt to contain all the information needed to give the requesting agency exactly what was desired.

Technical calculations had to be made regardless of how liberal the specifications. Naturally, technical experts who make calculations of a certain type every day can make these calculations faster than persons who make these calculations very rarely. The best qualified people were members of the Div API Section.

Calculations consisted primarily



of determining the number of photographs needed and the altitude that the plane would have to fly to provide the desired scale.

If oblique photography was requested, the section determined the altitude and flight line that had to be flown to provide the coverage. This flight line is shown as a broken line on figure 2b.

Another important reason for the technical processing at this time by a G2 agency was to insure that the requests were within the capabilities of our equipment. The equipment available limited the area we could photograph to that covered by a single strip of 12 overlapping photographs. Overlap was of the Naval standard—60 per cent. The area covered by 12 overlapping photographs at a scale of 1/4,000 is just over 2 miles long and 400 yards wide.

The TAOs, with the assistance of the pilots of VMO-6, determined the time in seconds required to fly the photographic flight line. This line is shown as the shaft of the arrow in figure 2a and as a broken line in figure 2b.

This total time, divided by the number of photographs needed to fill the request, told the air observer the time he had to measure between exposures. If the photographs were to be taken with a hand-held camera, the time was measured with a watch. If the camera was electrically operated, the time was set on the

IN THE NOVEMBER ISSUE OF THE GAZETTE LtCol Batterton asked, "Why is it that battalion can seldom get aerial photographs?" He further stated that, "It is unanimously agreed that something should be done about this problem. Is it possible to rig a camera in an OY or a helicopter to take aerial photographs?"

It is completely feasible to take tactical aerial photographs from observation aircraft and non-tactical aerial photographs from helicopters.

I was the Aerial Photographic Interpretation Officer, G2, 1st MarDiv, from June 1953 to February 1954. Just prior to that time I was assistant S3, 3d Bn, 7th Marines. During the time I was with the 7th Marines we couldn't get photographs of the Corps Reserve Area, much less the lines.

On transfer to G2, I set out to satisfy the need of the battalions. After several months of research, planning and willing co-operation from a great number of persons and agencies, a rapid and highly efficient system was developed. This system became doctrine when published in November 1953 as Annex Able to Division General Order 102.

The system established the following sequence of events: 1) Request, by either standard form or overlay, as shown in figures 1, 2a and 2b. 2) Technical processing, by the Div API Sec. 3) Taking the pictures by the methods illustrated on this page. The photographers were the tactical air observers of the Division Air and Air Observers Section, using the light aircraft and helicopters

Headquarters
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
 c/o Fleet Post Office
 San Francisco, California

PHOTOGRAPHIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE REQUEST FORM


- | | |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Unit: | 7. Approximate Scale: |
| 2. Request No. | 8. Type Photo Desired: |
| 3. Priority: | 9. Specific Information Desired: |
| 4. Deadline*: | 10. Number of Copies: |
| 5. TOT Desired | 11. Point of Delivery: |
| 6. Area Requested: | |

Date and time received:

Approved by G-2:

Unit Notified:

*Latest time receipt of information will be of value to requesting unit. Request will be cancelled at this time if not completed.

Figure 1 — Standard request form**Figure 2 — Samples of overlay requests**

intervalometer—the electrical timer that trips the shutter.

Protection of aircraft and personnel is vital. Although missions using this system were all flown after the cessation of hostilities, we concluded that under combat conditions, relative safety could be insured by firing flak suppression fires as the aircraft came on station, and then adopting a restrictive fire plan for a certain distance on each side of the flight line while the pictures were being taken. A second aircraft could fly cover over the plane with the camera to direct fire on targets of opportunity, as required.

Photographic processing included developing the negatives, writing the mission number (which had been assigned by the API Section) on the first negative and numbering each succeeding negative in sequence. Black or red china marking pencil was used for marking. The mission number and the print numbers showed up as white impressions on black on the finished prints. In most instances, 2 sets of contact prints were made.

Return processing by the API Section seldom took over half an hour and saved the requesting unit 5 hours. Processing consisted of accurately plotting the position of the photographs on an overlay. Photographs are worthless unless accurately located on the map. The training and practice of the API personnel saved the requesting unit the effort of plotting. At the same time, G2 was furnished a source of intelligence information otherwise not available.


For delivery, standard aerial message drop procedure is readily adaptable for use, although aerial delivery means was seldom employed.

Photographs were taken for the 1st Marines, the 7th Marines and the Kimpo Provisional Regiment using these procedures. Results were very acceptable, but would have been better using a fixed camera.

The shortest time from receipt of request to delivery of photography was just over 3 hours.

I think all FMF units can profit by this system. The end product is, at least, a partial satisfaction of one of the most pressing requirements for successful combat operations.

US MC



shoot

By Capt P. E. Sanders

Couple any one of the above with battlefield excitement and the odds are increased so that many of us wouldn't hit the side of a tank in actual close combat, the exact time when rapid and effective fire is needed.

I will not discuss the whys or wherefores of the reasons for inaccurate pistol shooting for I am sure that persons familiar with the .45 are well aware of the trials and tribulations of novice pistol shooters. However, I believe I have outlined below a good solution to problem of overcoming these defects in accurate, fast shooting:

1) The unsteady one-handed grip.

CORRECTION: Use a two-handed grip, arms extended, elbows locked, knees bent, body crouched forward.

2) Inability to line up the sights readily.

CORRECTION: Aim the pistol with body and arms, use innate ability to aim at, and hit, a close range target without actually looking through the sights.

3) Inability to fully control the pistol during rapid fire.

CORRECTION: Use two-handed grip method.

4) Tendency to jerk the trigger.

CORRECTION: Using two-handed grip, go ahead and jerk the trigger.

5) Tendency to buck.

CORRECTION: Two-handed grip reduces bucking tendency by a very large per cent, and, further, reduces effect of bucking.

So much for the manner of holding and firing the pistol. Now for the training necessary to fire the weapon effectively at close quarters. We know that a weapon is only a full value when it is kept in action. The pistol is a weapon. A weapon is out of action briefly as we reload. How quickly does the reader believe he can reload the pistol from his magazine pouch or carrier—5 seconds, 7 seconds, 3 seconds or 10 seconds? At close quarters, 5 seconds is

duce that the individual on the battlefield is going to be crouching, kneeling, or lying flat as he engages his target. It would be idiotic to assume that he is going to be standing in the approved firing line position coolly "squeezing them off," while the enemy closes with burp gun, grenade, or bayonet. Why, then, do we persist in our impractical precepts of pistol training?

Fundamentally, the .45 is a short range weapon—presumably 50 yards or less, mostly less. Anything over this range and the individual, especially an officer, is not doing his job, namely, directing his men, or fighting his crew served weapon and engaging the enemy with his pistol only when forced to protect himself at very close quarters. I recall that in the past, some leaders tended to get into the firefight with their carbines instead of directing the fire of their units.

Now, many Marines armed with the .45 have difficulty firing it with sufficient accuracy. Reasons?

1) Inability to hold the pistol steady with one hand. 2) Inability to line up the sights correctly. 3) Inability to fully control the weapon during rapid fire. 4) Tendency to jerk the trigger. 5) Tendency to buck the weapon.

A new method for training and scoring pistol shooters

Now THAT THE CARBINE IS DEFUNCT and the .45 pistol is the T/O weapon for officers and certain designated enlisted personnel, a new system for training these Marines to fire the weapon in combat is a must. It is my opinion that the present method of teaching Marines to fire the .45 pistol quickly and accurately is in need of complete revision.

It should be clear to all interested persons that firing line positions of individuals shooting the pistol for record, and the battlefield positions of individuals "shooting the pistol for record" are, of dire necessity, going to be quite different. It takes no great amount of acumen to de-

to hit!



a long time for a pistol to be out of action. Could the reader reload a .45 pistol in 5 seconds from a prone position? Reloading and re-aiming the rifle takes several more seconds, but the rifle is a long range weapon and time is not quite so important. Why should our training not include reloading the pistol from the belt?

As I stated previously, on the battlefield we would probably use the pistol from a crouch, from a kneeling position, or from flat on the deck. Therefore, it appears reasonable that we should teach our Marines to fire the weapon from these basic positions, and to fire rapidly and accurately.

I propose that the Marine Corps adopt a new system of pistol training, using a course like, or similar to, the one propounded. (See right.)

During the firing, the positions depicted in the illustrations are the basic positions, with possible variations in keeping with an individual's body conformation. It is necessary to kneel on the left knee so that the magazine pouch is readily accessible. In the prone position the shooter has merely to roll slightly to his right to uncover his magazine pouch. Since present training with the .45 pistol requires loading with the left hand there should be no awkwardness on the part of individuals reloading from the belt.

You may well ask "why such rapid fire?" It is my contention that when conditions necessitate that an individual protect himself with his .45 pistol, 20 or 25 seconds is going to

seem a lifetime and he had better be able to shoot fast and straight.

With a new record course a new scoring system is needed. It is generally accepted that a .45 slug will put a man out of action if it penetrates his head, his neck, or his torso. So, the following scoring system is offered:

On the regular silhouette target all hits count 5 points except for hits which break the edge of the target. Such hits count 1 point. Misses, of course, count zero. Total possible points—300. Based on present percentages—Expert—255 Sharpshooter—240 Marksman—215.

Here, then, is my solution to what I believe to be a better method of training Marines for combat. I believe that our present method of training pistol shooters is inadequate because it does not prepare Marines for their true combat role. Training which does not prepare a man for his combat role is of limited value and not in keeping with the best interests of the man or the Marine Corps. USMC

15 YARDS:

Position	No. of rounds	Time
Crouching (from standing)	10	20 sec
Kneeling (from standing)	10	20 sec
Prone (from standing)	10	25 sec

25 YARDS:

Crouching (from standing)	10	20 sec
Kneeling (from standing)	10	20 sec
Prone (from standing)	10	25 sec

The stated times include reloading with a 5-round magazine from the belt



SEVERAL YEARS AGO PROMOTION examinations as we know them were introduced as an integral part of the Marine Corps promotion system. Although examinations for promotion within the officer ranks are suspended for the present, most enlisted personnel except those receiving meritorious promotions, are required to attain a passing score on one or more types of written examinations before they are eligible for promotion. In addition, passing a promotion examination is now one of the requirements for appointment to warrant officer or limited duty officer.

Because promotion examinations have become such an important aspect of the Marine's prospect for advancement, it would seem appropriate that his officers and senior noncommissioned officers know what he should do to best prepare himself for the test and what they can do to help him. This article is directed toward those objectives.

First, it is necessary to examine how the enlisted promotion examination fits into the system. The tests are designed to determine whether or not a Marine has the necessary professional knowledge to operate effectively in the next higher rank. Passing the test indicates that he possesses the required professional knowledge and it provides the key to his entry into the selection system. It must be remembered that success in his promotion test is only one event, albeit a very important one, of a sequence of events leading to a Marine's promotion. After he has passed his examination, the system is essentially based, as it should be, on the principle that final authority to promote is the commanding officer's prerogative. No matter how high a score he attains on his written test, a Marine must ultimately display to his commanding officer's satisfaction the required leadership, moral and personal characteristics of the next higher grade before he can be assured of promotion. Otherwise, the commanding officer can refuse to promote those personnel he himself is eligible to promote and can withhold appointments to technical or master sergeant by justifying his reasons to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The commanding officer also controls promotions in

Success in promotion examinations is a by-product of preparation. Commanders and senior NCOs should know how they can best assist their men to . . .



prepare for **PROMOTION**

By Capt R. M. Erbland

Illustrations furnished by T&E Unit, MCS

that he is responsible for service record book markings which help determine composite scores. These in turn are used to determine when a Marine, otherwise qualified, will be promoted in the lower noncommissioned ranks. The commanding officer marks the staff noncommissioned officer fitness reports and these markings are used by noncommissioned officer promotion boards which meet at Headquarters Marine Corps to determine the best Marines eligible for promotion to technical and master sergeant. So, although it is not

the only aspect of the enlisted promotion system, the passing of a written examination is the first step on the road to advancement.

In order that everyone know the situation, it will be helpful to cover the agency that prepares the examinations, explain how they are prepared, why they are considered valid tests and, also, to clear up some of the misconceptions that Marines may have about their testing program.

As all Marines should know, but many do not, promotion tests are

prepared by the Testing and Educational Unit, which is located at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. This organization operates under the technical and management control of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. It is located at Marine Corps Schools mainly for the value of maintaining close liaison with the schools and various sources of up-to-date professional information which are at Quantico.

The Testing and Educational Unit is divided into 8 test-writing sections representing the most densely populated occupational fields in the Marine Corps. Each section is headed by an officer who is assisted by one or more master sergeants, all of whom are eminently qualified in their military occupational specialties.

When these personnel first report for duty at the Unit, they are given an extensive indoctrination in test construction and commence writing tests only after they have satisfactorily shown that they have learned how. In addition, there is an administrative staff under the sergeant major to handle test reproduction, mailing and scoring as well as a co-ordination and review section to check each test when completed. The Unit is headed by an officer-in-charge who gives final approval on any test that is sent to the field.

As pointed out previously, only the major military occupational fields are represented at the Unit by personnel assigned there on a permanent duty status. To prepare tests covering MOSs not represented by permanent personnel, well qualified specialists are ordered to the Unit on temporary duty by Headquarters Marine Corps on the basis of their records. They are given a short course in test construction on arrival and work under the close supervision of one of the permanent personnel. Finally there are the "outside reviewers," also exceptionally well qualified Marines, ordered to the Unit for temporary duty to review a completed test. So much for the personnel who write and process the tests.

Next, let's examine how tests are prepared. The basis for each technical test is an outline which covers the MOS Manual job description for the MOS being tested. In the

case of the general military subjects tests, the outline is based on the subjects and references in the Marine Corps General Orders covering training for enlisted men and women. Each task within a job description is covered in a technical test, as is each subject in the training orders in the case of the general military subjects test. The number of items covering each task or subject is based on its importance relative to the overall job. The outline is prepared by the examiner responsible for the test. It is then checked for completeness and content by the co-ordination and review officer and the officer-in-charge. After the outline is approved the actual test writing begins.

Each item (question) in the test must be prepared according to standard achievement test construction procedures. The item consists of a lead, which sets up the problem, and 4 possible answers. The lead must represent a complete thought and the distractors (alternative answers) must be logical. There can be no flaws in grammar. Perhaps most important, there must be only *one* definitely best answer. For example, compare these two items:

The most effective weapon used by the rifle company is the

- A) M1 rifle
- B) LMG
- C) BAR
- D) 60mm mortar

Which weapon is organic to the weapons company of an infantry

battalion?

- A) 75mm recoilless rifle
- B) 4.2" mortar
- C) 60mm mortar
- D) 81mm mortar

There is no unequivocally correct answer to the first question. It depends on the target or situation. The second question, however, can be answered correctly only by choosing "D."

A certain number of questions are "picture items," that is, they contain a picture or diagram. This is done partly to add interest to the test and also because some subjects are best tested by use of an illustration. Authoritative information is used for all items and each must be backed up by a standard reference. When the examination is completed to the satisfaction of the examiner and his section chief, it is submitted to the co-ordination and review officer for his approval. He recommends changes as necessary and the test is returned to the examiner.

From the drafting of the outline to the time the test appears in its final rough form, it has been approached continuously with these points in mind:

1) Is each item practical? Does it really ask something that a Marine must know in order to perform his job well? For instance, such a question as, "How long is the operating rod spring on an M1 rifle?" is not a very valuable yardstick to measure whether a private first class can perform well as a corporal. It merely



tests his memory. However, consider this item:

At a range of 200 yards, adding 2 clicks on the elevating knob of the M1 rifle will raise the strike of the bullet

- A) 2 inches
- B) 4 inches
- C) 8 inches
- D) 10 inches

If the private first class knows that "B" is the correct answer, then he as a corporal can teach something practical to men in his fire team.

2) Is the test realistic? Does it reflect the way things are actually done by Marines in the field, or do the items sound as if they were lifted from a text book?

3) Is the test comprehensive? Does it cover all the aspects of the job for the rank tested and, is the number of items related to each task weighted to conform to the importance of that task?

As a final check to determine whether the test meets these requirements, the outside reviewer is ordered to the Unit to evaluate it from the field standpoint. He takes the examination and then comments on its difficulty and validity (Is the test written so that the best qualified men will get the best grades?). If he has criticisms and they are well founded, changes are made. Now the examination is ready for the typist, artist (picture items), proof-reading and reproduction. After that it goes on the "shelf" until requisitioned by the field.

To this point, I have endeavored to show what goes into making the promotion tests do their job. That is, determining which men are best qualified for promotion. Next I'll explain how the constructors determine whether the tests are doing their job or not. After writing test items for a certain length of time the people at the Unit can pretty well feel whether an item is good or not. But they don't just trust their intuition in this matter. Each item, after it has been used on a promotion test, starts to pick up a history. It has been typed previously on a card which contains spaces on the back for the statistical analysis of the item. After it has been used on a test it is possible to determine the percentage of examinees who knew the correct answer and from this it

can be determined how difficult the item was. Also the discrimination value of the item (which men know most about their job) can be worked out statistically by a formula which compares the number of the high scorers on the test getting the item correct with the number of low scorers who answered the item correctly. If an item is at the proper level of difficulty and if a greater number of high scorers than low scorers chose the correct answer, then it has done its job. The above data are recorded on the item card and it is filed for use at a much later testing period. The Unit has hundreds of thousands of such items on file and every test has a certain percentage of "known to be good items" which, after some alteration, are usable again.

Now with the information of how the tests are prepared in mind, what should a man do to improve his chances of passing a technical promotion test? The surest way is to learn his job — all parts of it. Then he can't help but attain a good, high score. But suppose he isn't sure of all the requirements of his job? He should first get out the Marine Corps MOS Manual, look up his MOS job description and check the requirements for the rank to which he is to be promoted. Then he should go right down the line and ask himself if he honestly knows what each task means and if he can do it. The higher the rank he is being examined for, the more the supervisory requirements will be



stressed. He should determine which tasks of the job description are the most important, which ones he does most often. Those are the areas that are going to be covered most extensively in the examination. If these are areas in which he thinks he is deficient, he will be wise to get out the FMs and TMs that cover that part of the job and study the sections that apply.

A word of caution here. It isn't economical to try to memorize an entire manual. Study those parts that correspond to the important aspects of your job. A good way to determine what is most important is to get advice from someone more experienced in the MOS. He should ask the organizational education officer whether there are Marine Corps Institute or Marine Corps Extension School courses available that teach his MOS or parts of his MOS. At present the Marine Corps Institute and the Extension School have many excellent courses which are tailored to help a Marine to know his job. More are being offered each month.

In the case of preparing for the general military subjects tests, one's first step should be to go to his organization's files and get a copy of the appropriate Marine Corps General Order on individual training. In that order will be found the general subjects which are covered in the general military subjects tests. Can the Marine honestly say he knows these subjects? If not, the references are listed in the order

and they should be available at his unit training library. The *Guidebook for Marines*, as mentioned in the training orders, is an excellent source of information. Here again the Extension School has a wealth of courses which are tailored especially to teaching Marines the basic general subjects.

In passing, a word of caution on what *not* to do to obtain a high grade on a promotion test. An examinee shouldn't try to cram everything into his head during the last day or two before the test, nor should he go into the examination room hoping to be lucky enough to pick the correct answers. It's too late then. Statistically, an examinee can get a certain number of answers correct by guessing, but that won't give a high enough score to pass. A further word of caution — a man can't beat the scoring machines by hoping to better his chances of passing by marking more than one answer for each question. Each and every answer sheet is scanned by the Unit personnel before being machine-scored and such attempts are always detected, resulting in disqualification for that testing period.

Commanders and leaders have many ways at their disposal to help their personnel score well on the promotion examinations. One of the best ways is to organize group study and discussion periods based on Marine Corps Institute and Extension School courses. Provide for systematic on-the-job and after-hours instruction in the subjects that men should know to do their jobs. If this is co-ordinated with a well-run unit training program, there is every reason to assume that the individual is going to know the technical requirements of his MOS as well as his general subjects. Leaders should make sure that manuals and publications in the unit training library are available to all the troops and not just personnel connected with the training program. Explain to your men that the tests cover their job as they are expected to perform it. Each Marine should be made to understand that every care and effort is taken to make his test as fair and valid as is humanly possible.

Everything in the tests is there because it is something that experts

in his MOS feel he should know. There are no "trick" questions. If any of the questions seem to require obscure knowledge to be answered properly, it is probable that he just doesn't know his job well. Tell him that the promotion test is one of the instruments that is used to select the *best* men for promotion; therefore the man who knows his job very well helps himself in 3 ways: 1) His commanding officer knows he is a good man and will recommend and desire his promotion. 2) His record will be better, which will help raise his composite score or, in the case of staff noncommissioned officers, insure high fitness reports for consideration by the promotion board at Headquarters Marine Corps. 3) He will obtain a score on the test sheet which is sufficiently high to enable him to pass the test. It cannot be overemphasized how important the high score is because, with competition for promotion becoming increasingly keen, a mediocre score will not be a "passing" score.

Finally, there are those persons who, even when well instructed, do poorly on an examination because of their psychological approach to a


test. It overawes them. They experience a mental block. In order to help such persons to overcome their fears, a commander can condition them by administering tests similar to the promotion examinations when establishing the service record book markings for training proficiency. As a means of doing this, the Marine Corps Institute offers a short course in test construction which teaches the standard achievement test construction procedures. Personnel involved in administering a unit training program should be urged to take this course so that locally prepared examinations will parallel the promotion tests.

If a Marine prepares for testing in the manner I have suggested with the knowledge that the test covers his duties as he is expected to know and perform them, success in the promotion examinations is a by-product. The most important thing accomplished is that he: has learned more about his job and thereby increased his own ability; becomes an asset to his organization and ultimately is doing his part to maintain the high level of efficiency of the Marine Corps.

USMC

3rd BN. BULLETIN Bd.

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GMST Subjects Lt. Jones
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A. FRAME
MAJ. USMC
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
DEAD RECKONING

● TTULANT—I read with great interest in the March issue the very excellent article entitled *NGF Support in the Solomons* by Col Henderson. It brought back a flood of memories as I was mixed up in that affair for 6 months. Colonel Henderson points out how ill-prepared we were to tackle the job which confronted us and I would like to add a few comments.

You will remember that at the time the 1st Mar Div made the landing on Guadalcanal it was shy one of its RLTs and the 2d RLT, with the 3d Bn, 10th Marines attached, was assigned to the 1st Mar Div to make up the shortage. I commanded 3/10 at the time. The 2d RLT rendezvoused with the Division at sea and never had an opportunity to run through a full scale rehearsal with them. We did, however, have a bob-tailed rehearsal in the Fiji Islands a few days before the actual landing. This consisted essentially of a ship-to-shore drill. While we were there, RLT2 was ordered to send an artillery officer to one of the heavy cruisers of our escort (I believe it was the *Vincennes*) to hold school for the gunnery officers of the gunfire support ships on how to attack shore targets. I was the only officer qualified and available and was so assigned. The Naval gunnery officers and their assistants were most attentive and cooperative, but it was obvious that few, if any of them, had been previously exposed to naval gunfire doctrines as then developed. The instructor was extremely fortunate inasmuch as he had only 2 years before completed a tour of duty at the Marine Corps Schools as instructor in field artillery and naval gunfire techniques. Furthermore, he had had the good fortune to have been an instructor in a Navy secondary battery gunnery school afloat on sea duty the previous year. I like to think we accomplished a great deal that afternoon. Following this conference, we went aboard Adm Norman Scott's flagship, the *San Juan*, along with officers who would be spotters on the various other ships, and we actually practiced attacking targets on a small uninhabited island. The instructor assigned the targets and critiqued each problem as is normally

done in the training of field artillery officers. As far as I know, this was the only NGF training that these officers had prior to the assault against Guadalcanal and Tulagi less than a week later.

Naval gunfire plans for the landings both on Guadalcanal and in the Tulagi areas were apparently prepared by the 11th Marines headquarters. I know that they were very simple and consisted mainly of beach bombardment. The landing on Guadalcanal was, of course, practically unopposed so that the naval gunfire task there was a very simple one. However, a very bitter fight developed when the Marines attacked Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo about 20 miles to the north. The enemy holed-up in hillside caves and resisted to the death.



In the case of Gavutu and Tanambogo a destroyer closed in to extremely short range and blasted both of these little islands to rubble. If, as Col Henderson reports, COMSOPAC was concerned about ships lying to and firing on targets at short range, that headquarters would have been most distressed at the savage manner in which this gallant destroyer closed with and demolished its targets.

Colonel Henderson reports the occasion on which a destroyer ranging along the coast at Guadalcanal caught a column of Japanese soldiers in close formation and opened fire on them by surprise. This, too, I remember well as I was the officer from the 10th Marines involved. It may be of interest to know that this force of 4 destroyers was commanded by "Commodore" (Captain) Briscoe, now VAdm Robert P. Briscoe, USN. His Operations Officer was, I believe, the movie actor, Robert Montgomery. Actually this column of Japanese soldiers was first spotted by the

sharp eyes of a sailor who was a casual observer at the time leaning on the life lines. And he reported them casually as he thought they were US Marines. I got in the act at that point, with much less calm than the Bluejacket displayed.

From the viewpoint of personal satisfaction, that was the best day's shooting that I experienced either as an artilleryman or as a naval gunfire spotter. A little earlier in the day we had a great deal of luck in attacking a target which could not be seen from the sea. Actually, this target could not be seen easily from any place occupied by friendly troops. G2, by photo interpretation, had picked up a suspected center of Japanese activity hidden by the dense undergrowth well inland. Just prior to embarking, I had been handed a vertical photo with this area circled in grease pencil with the remark that if we could by any chance see it we should take it under fire. The target was in fact several hundred yards inland but the photograph showed a part of the nearby coastline with a small peninsula which could be identified on an ancient British Admiralty navigation chart. The photograph also showed a patch of the Lever Brothers coconut trees in orderly pattern. Since we knew the standard spacing of the trees, we were able to determine a scale for the photo and hence reconstitute the target to the hydrographic chart which showed little or no detail inland. The situation is shown in the accompanying sketch. The target was plotted at Y. The nearby point of land is shown at X. Having determined the position of Y with respect to X, it was a simple matter to determine the azimuth of the line XY. In attacking this target the destroyer steamed along slowly parallel to the coast from A to B. While doing so it ranged on the point X. When the ship was on the line XY extended, it increased the range by the distance XY and fired 2 salvos. This was rewarded by huge clouds of yellow smoke boiling up above the jungle. Since this yellow smoke was typical of picric acid explosives commonly used by the Japanese, we concluded that we had hit an ammunition dump. Artillerymen will recognize this as the common old transfer of fire, but it may have been the first time the technique was applied to naval gunfire.

I have described the method of attacking this particular target because it points up the serious handicap under which all gunnery officers labored, both ashore and afloat, from the lack of adequate maps. The map furnished the troops for the initial landing on Guadalcanal was actually a crude tracing of air photos hastily assembled and virtually uncontrolled. The map, (if it may be

dignified by that name) was reproduced on a mimeograph machine and the various sectors were pasted together with office paste. Needless to say it was worthless for gunnery purposes.

When we finally left Guadalcanal in February of '43, we still didn't have a fire-control map and much ingenuity had been displayed in offsetting this disadvantage. For example there was the night we laid our gun parallel by sighting on the evening star—but that, as Kipling would say, is another story.

Col. M. L. Curry

RE-DISC HASLAM

QUANTICO, VA.—I have read with interest Capt Witkowski's article *Haslam Rebutted* and I would like to point out several inconsistencies made by the author which make his so called "rebuttal" a misnomer.

First, I believe I can accurately summarize the gist of the Captain's article by saying he is of the opinion our present shooting positions, practices and the entire marksmanship program in existence are adequate and should not be changed or eliminated. Now, understanding the position of the author I can go ahead and point out his first inconsistency. He states and I quote, "... I wholeheartedly agree with Capt Haslam for the need of a more realistic combat training course on rifle marksmanship." Then, for some unknown reason, he traverses 180 degrees and makes this conflicting statement in the last paragraph of his article, "I doubt that the solution to the problem . . . is doing away with or changing our present marksmanship program. It seems to be quite adequate as set forth in the *Marine Corps Manual*." On the one hand the author states we need a more realistic training course and, almost in the same breath, he states that our present training is quite adequate. It is extremely difficult to surrebut something that is both with and against me, but I will do my very best.

Second, the author states the solution to the problem is not doing away with or changing our present marksmanship program. The Captain makes mention of a problem. There is no problem. All we have to do is wait until a new combat training course comes our way and fit it into the second phase of rifle marksmanship as mentioned by the Captain. Also, I do not have the slightest idea how the author can entertain the notion that I advocated the elimination of our present marksmanship program. I certainly did not say that in my paper nor did I imply it. As a matter of fact I expressly stated that we should retain our present known

distance firing course for the training of recruits and competitive shooting.

Third, the Captain points out the 4 phases of rifle marksmanship whereas I only pointed out one. I would like to call attention to the second phase of the 4 phases listed by the Captain; namely, "Individual field course firing or individual instruction in fire and movement against obscure and moving targets at varying distances. . ." Now, how does the author expect to fulfill the provisions of the 4 phases he mentions unless he accepts the new course being developed? The new combat marksmanship training course which I mentioned is the item to permit the carrying out of the program mentioned. We do not have the optimum course yet, but we are striving to obtain one that will fulfill not only the second phase but the third and fourth also.

Fourth, the statement was made, notwithstanding the position taken by the author, that the use of the rifle sling is inadequate. He takes great pains to point out that qualification scores would be increased if the sling were discarded. He goes even farther by saying the sling could probably be removed for rapid fire but the scores would suffer "... but not even then to the extent that people might imagine." Such statements as these lead one to believe that even the author, down deep in his own heart, believes that some of the very things I take issue with in my paper have no part in our present training program.

Fifth, except for the mentioning of not using the sling, the author is unusually silent in respect to the use of shooting glasses, shooting jackets, carbide lamps to blacken sights, shooting gloves and other devices and procedures. I naturally assume from his silence that he approves of such devices and therefore believes that they enhance the chances of obtaining first-round hits in combat.

Sixth, I believe the Captain missed the point of my article or, perhaps, I did not sharpen it enough. However, the gist of my paper was—that I was (and I still am) against carrying over the absurd shooting positions and practices we presently teach into any new combat training course. Also I was, and still am, for equipping the Marine rifleman with true combat apparel while he traverses the new course. If the Captain were to thoroughly check the article which he purports to rebut (?) he will see that in discussing the offhand position I stated, "Naturally it is used in a modified form; . . . and many others." I do not deny that the offhand position was used in past battles but *not the way it is presently taught* and the way we know it to be. The films the author mentions show Marines firing their

weapons offhand from a crouch and sometimes at a slow trot but nowhere can the films show me a Marine or soldier, positioned in the open terrain, utilizing the offhand position as we are taught it today. To hold otherwise would violate the very principles we are taught in respect to utilization of cover, concealment and, most important, the inherent principle of self preservation.

Seventh, the Captain while discussing the importance of the sitting and kneeling positions asks this question, "The prone position is by far the best position to use . . . but have you ever tried shooting from the prone position in 3 feet of water, tall grass, wheat field, corn field, etc?" Before answering that question I would like to point out that firing from the prone position in 3 feet of water is no more absurd than proposing the utilization of the sitting and kneeling positions for the same depth. If the author, however, had read my article carefully he would have found this statement, "A Marine will move forward at a crouch . . . and like in combat he will fire from a position which lends itself to the terrain and affords the marksman a maximum amount of protection."

Finally the author is entitled to his opinion that our present marksmanship training program is adequate. As for me, until the necessary devices are available, I entertain the notion that it is adequate for competitive shooting only and leaves much to be desired.

Capt C. B. Haslam

REMOTE IMPOSSIBILITIES

CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF.—When articles such as *Communications Curse Cured* (Feb 56) try to inform the readers of the *GAZETTE* of the communications problems, I believe it necessary to make a comment in hope that there will not be too many ill-advised persons.

As for *Communication Curse Cured*, it states the present system of remoting is a troublesome, inefficient, undependable, time-consuming wallow of frequent failure and constant maintenance. I am sure there were several instances where remoting systems were used by the 11th Marines in Korea.

The system of retransmission as a replacement for wire remotes is completely impossible, unreasonable and impracticable for several reasons. Even though the retransmitting station can move about continuously while operating, the capabilities of the unit become nil for retransmission purposes. The author admitted as much when he stated that the equipment operates on a squelch relay system. The constant tuning of squelch controls is necessary even when stationary if the other stations involved are

moving. Think of the busy operator at the retransmission point if his station is moving, thus causing incoming signals to waver and fade.

In the Korean example, the idea might be feasible, but the ranges involved make me accept it with a grain of salt and make the statement that it isn't safe and sure enough for a CO to accept as good sound communications.

The drawings show operating ranges as 3 to 5 miles on the close side and 10 to 15 miles for the distant stations, but the operation range of the set #2 is approximately 1 mile with a rated output of $\frac{1}{2}$ watt; therefore, the maximum range (and even that isn't dependable) would be 1 mile for remot-ing possibilities. The PRC-10 will send a signal 3 to 5 miles so, in one-way operation, the drawings are correct but it would make a very poor completed circuit. A regimental tactical net would be worthless if communication were in only one direction. In fact any net would be except for Foxtrot-type transmissions.

The fact that subordinate units could not hear each other would also cause a great deal of confusion on a tactical net when traffic flow is almost continuous.

To sum up, I would say that the 2-mile remot-ing possibilities of the AN/GRA-6 remote is much better than the 1-mile capability of the retransmission unit. Army-type sets such as the VRQ and VRC series which use two #1 sets in each would be the answer.

As to the over-taxing of wire personnel and wire equipment: the new family of radio equipment was designed with the express purpose of having command communications with the front-line soldier through the use of the SB-22 switchboards. The possibilities of remot-ing several radio circuits to a switch-board and using GRA-6 distant remotes as telephones, gives the staff sections access to each and every circuit simply by calling the switchboard operator and asking for the circuit he desires. Again the subject of distance comes up, but how many COs want equipment more than 2 miles from the Command Post? This means more security problems for them.

The new equipment now being evaluated by the Marine Corps would be the cure to the curse. Information on the new equipment now being evaluated can be obtained from the Marine Corps Extension School, Quantico, Virginia, by enrolling in the Communications Officer Extension Course C-2-1 (Field Radio Communications). Also complete details on capabilities and limitations on equipment presently being used can be found in this course.

TSgt L. R. Wickman

DUPLICATE DUPLICATES

✱ CAMP LEJEUNE, NC—This dissertation has not been prepared to discredit the efforts of office management in the Marine Corps, but rather to disclose a unique situation existing in the preparation and distribution of routine orders, combat orders and regulations that should be evaluated.

Let's start with paragraph 143 of the Manual for Courts Martial, 1951. In essence, it says that a duplicate original is equally admissible as a pen-and-ink signed original as evidence in a Courts Martial. A copy of an original, including relevant signatures, made by photographic or other duplicating process is considered a duplicate original.

A cursory inspection of Chap 22, Marine Corps Manual, and Chap 8 of the Staff Manual indicates that routine orders, regulations or combat orders have at least one thing in common—the ending. The signature section, distribution formula, and the authentication section constitute this ending. The preparation of these sections is identical, but two or three "weasel words" found in each instruction permit exceptions which have become commonplace rather than exceptions.

The commander, his executive officer, or chief of staff normally signs all orders; however, if duplicating copies of an order prior to obtaining a signature is convenient, then the copies must be authenticated. Here the old expression fits to a "T"—"Give 'em an inch and they'll take a mile." For the convenience of the "signers" everything is authenticated. At what cost?

Let's examine an order drafted by a staff section for a training exercise. A rough draft or the completed draft, prepared on mimeograph stencils with the authentication section completed and signed, is presented to the commander for approval. To keep the commander from signing his name twice, once on a stencil and again on a copy to be filed as an original or for some other nebulous reason, the adjutant has authenticated the duplicating medium.

The authentication section requires a total of 7 lines of typing which is duplicated on an additional sheet of paper, if necessary. For example, an examination of the 100 Camp General Orders and Camp Memoranda promulgated at a large Marine Corps base, in one year found 15 documents which fell in this category. The camp's distribution formula averages about 800 copies. Simple arithmetic indicates that 12,000 sheets or 24 reams of paper were distributed in that year bearing nothing but an authentication section. There

are other documents in the same category at other echelons of command. Company-level orders are even handled the same way.

Another ambiguous situation exists in the duplicating room. Not only is it necessary to remove the commander's signature from one copy if he elected to sign the duplicating medium, but the authentication section must be removed from an authenticated copy as well. This copy the commander will sign later for the original file. True, the cart is before the horse, but this is "convenient!" Worthy of note is that the removal of portions of a document is an additional chore for the duplicator operator which results in an additional waste of paper in accomplishment.

Both the Marine Corps Manual and the Staff Manual indicate that the authentication section is not a requirement if the signature of one of the 3 top executives is reproduced on the copies. Furthermore, in the absence of the 3 top executives, the adjutant has authority to sign the signature section. Then why authenticate the copies?

Here are a few "reasons" given:

1. "Why not authenticate them? It's permissible!"

2. "Duplicate originals are not accepted for file as originals. If a commander signs a duplicating medium thus permitting his signature to be reproduced on the copies, he still must sign the same order again. His duplicated signature must be removed from one of the copies so that a pen-and-ink signature may be applied. This copy will be filed as an original."

3. "Many commanders expect the authentication section to be completed and signed when they receive a document for approval." (Why?) "It's a general practice—an accepted exception."

We assume the facts established in the UCMJ are bona fide. Is it not safe to say, therefore, that an original file may consist of both duplicate originals and pen-and-ink originals?

We've had this situation with us long enough. Let's change our instructions, spelling out a simple procedure that will do away with the familiar plaintive cries for the "Original."

Capt R. W. Crook

NIGHT-IN-MESS

✱ 9TH MARINES, REINF—Read with much interest Col Williams' article on *Mess Night*. At one time I believe Col Williams commanded the 3d Marines. From word of mouth from that fine outfit and through the nimble memory of LtCol Frank Gunner, a one-time 3d Marine stalwart, we of the 9th Marines developed what we call a *Night-in-Mess*.

Being in Okinawa and in the FMF, we find our *Night-in-Mess* differs slightly from that generally outlined by Col Williams. Briefly, ours is as follows:

- Uniform: Greens or Khaki with blouse (Navy Blues or Khaki).
- Cocktails in party area of Rykus COM 1800.
- Officers Call on bugle 1900.
- Company grade officers march in to dining room without music in column of twos. Take places and remain standing.
- Field officers march in to dining room to a drum beat in column of twos. Take places and remain standing.
- CO and distinguished guest, if any (guests below colonel march in with respective rank group) march in to Drum & Bugle Corps playing the 9th Marines Marching Song. (This song is known to a small segment of the public as "The Yellow Rose of Texas.") Stand at places.
- Chaplain offers a short grace.
- Seats and eat dinner. Tables are arranged as a letter U or E on its side depending on the number of officers present (field work cuts it down).
- End of meal the Mess Pres (Regimental Exec) calls, *Mr. Vice, the Commander-in-Chief*.
- Mr. Vice, the junior 2dLt, stands and offers the toast, *Gentlemen, I propose a toast to ———*.
- Same procedure through all toasts, not forgetting visitors.
- Final toast: CO places right foot on chair, left foot on table and proposes a toast to the 9th Marines. All hands drink the toast with left foot on table.
- Dinner is completed when CO and guests depart for party room.

Details are same in regards to smoking and wine decanters. It makes a fine evening with all the officers of an organization sitting down together for a formal dinner. We look forward to it, particularly since we spend so very much of our time in the field (mostly mud here on Okinawa) and little opportunity to get together as one unit.

Many thanks to Col Williams for starting the call here in the 3d MarDiv. We are keeping it as a permanent part of the Regiment's customs.

Col H. B. Bengel

PROVISIONAL PLATOONS

T&T REGT, MCS, QUANTICO, VA.—

At a recent presentation at Marine Corps Schools, a situation arose in which the need for an "extra" platoon was found in the operation plan of the battalion commander. It is assumed that this need was verified and approved by the next higher echelon.

Briefly this was the situation: a Marine infantry battalion was to make a helicopter assault, as part of a larger landing force, to destroy the enemy, and to seize and defend strategically important terrain located in its zone of action. To enable one rifle company to accom-

plish its mission it was determined that it would have to be reinforced with a fourth rifle platoon. The landing plan and scheme of maneuver called for all units of the parent regiment to be in the assault, in other words, "nothing back." In this particular instance, to meet the requirement for this additional platoon, it was decided to form a provisional rifle platoon from the elements of the H&S Co of the battalion involved. This line of thought is apparently becoming prevalent. It establishes a dangerous precedent, especially when it appears in the planning stage of an operation. In this, or any similar instance, it is inherently dangerous, an unsound use of manpower and is opposed to the tradition of teamwork within the Marine Corps to form units as these for offensive action.

Now, provisional platoons are fine things to have in any battalion. They provide the needed implementation to any SOP for the close-in defense of the unit's CP. Why then say it is "inherently dangerous, an unsound use of manpower and is opposed to the tradition of teamwork within the Marine Corps?" To answer the question posed, let us take a look at the typical provisional rifle platoon formed in a battalion from H&S Co personnel.

The usual provisional rifle platoon is composed of personnel from various sections of our H&S Co, i.e., S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, Supply, Mess, Communications and Service personnel. These Marines are already *trained members* of a team. They all have definite jobs to perform; if they haven't they're excess baggage to their sections and shouldn't be around. These men are Marines and every Marine is basically a rifleman. Some of them should, and will be members of the H&S Co provisional platoon, which should have the primary mission of close-in defense of the battalion CP. They should train together in this role of close-in defense of the battalion CP to develop the needed cohesion and teamwork for this task. This training, however, will not suit such a unit for the normal role generally assigned a rifle platoon — offensive action.

The situation, as given in the presentation, gave the mission to the provisional platoon, of defending and holding important ground in the battalion's zone of action. The mission was defense, but it took offensive action, i.e., a vertical assault, to get the provisional platoon into position. Furthermore, experience has shown such actions to be difficult and casualty producing.

It is dangerous to assign to this type of an organization such a mission. By taking 44 men and one officer away from their normal duties someone is

going to come up short somewhere along the line. The L series T/O shows 156 enlisted Marines in H&S Co. If a T/O rifle platoon is formed from this number we have "reduced" the strength of H&S Co by 30 per cent. How would you, "Captain Staff Officer" like to operate your section in widely dispersed action with an initial 30 per cent reduction? Remember too, litter bearers must come from the remaining 70 per cent. Some of these 45 are going to become casualties. Again, somebody comes up short. In fact, experience has shown that a proportionately greater number of casualties will be incurred by a provisional platoon when it is given the same mission as a normal T/O platoon. In this day of wide dispersion of units it takes a proportional increase in the amount of effort to be put forth by the staff sections to support these units. We have weakened the staff sections by taking their personnel, and thereby affected their ability to perform their primary mission, that of supporting the "combat" units. This is then, inherently dangerous and an unsound use of manpower.

The use of a provisional platoon in such a role is opposed to the tradition of teamwork in the Marine Corps. A group of men, largely unknown to each other, and unable to continually train together will not be capable of performing competently in offensive action. They can shoot, and they'll do a bang-up job of defending the CP, but they're not up to playing ball in the same league with the letter company platoons.

In Korea many Marines saw provisional platoons in action. They also saw the proposed solution to this situation in action, that of attaching a rifle platoon from the reserve to the company needing the extra platoon.

This, then, is offered as "a solution," and generally is the preferred solution, by staff officers and company commanders alike; attach, in this instance, to the company needing the extra platoon, a rifle platoon from the reserve regiment. Attach this platoon in the reserve area. Append a team to a larger team. In reality only the "team leaders" must get to know each other. It is realized that this violates a general principle of war, commitment of the reserve piecemeal. Attachment, in this instance, presents the lesser of two evils when it becomes necessary to move from a triangle to a quadrangle. If we are faced with such a move let us do it in a manner that will give us a true square, not a lopsided polygon. Let us not use our H&S Co provisional platoon in premeditated action outside of the planned close-in defense of our CPs.

Capt G. J. Cizek

passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

The Plot—An Appraisal . . .

20 JULY—Constantine FitzGibbon.
220 pages, illus., appendices, index.
New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1956. \$3.75

The one-armed Colonel entered the room diffidently, saluted and apologized for being late for the briefing. He placed his bulging briefcase under the heavy oaken table at which Adolph Hitler sat listening to the latest bad news from the Russian front. It was 1237 hours on a sultry summer day.

Exactly 5 minutes later the plastic explosive in the Colonel's briefcase exploded with a shattering roar. The building in which Hitler and some of his principal staff officers were meeting rocked under the shattering impact, equivalent to a direct hit from a 155mm shell.

The date was 20 July 1944. The place, Rastenburg—Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia. And the one-armed Colonel with the deadly briefcase was Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenberg.


Constantine FitzGibbon, who will be remembered for his excellent translation of Guderian's autobiography, has analyzed the story of this attempt on Hitler's life. He has concerned himself with examining the motivation of the men who, for a brief moment, hitch-hiked a ride on the coat tails of Destiny. Mr. FitzGibbon's purpose in writing *20 July* is best expressed in his own words: "to interest people in what was, in some ways, the most remarkable incident of our generation."

Now this, I submit, is a fairly sweeping statement and should be examined with some care. Let's go back a bit.

Both in our own newspapers here at home, and those of our Allies abroad, the attempt to assassinate Hitler did not create a great stir. The whole matter was regarded as almost incidental. In this respect we were actually reflecting the official propaganda of the Hitler regime. The German announcement of the event was simply that a small group of officers had attempted a traitorous, ineffectual coup d'etat and had come a cropper. The Allied governments without exception took a similar view of the whole affair and brushed the event off as a mere adventure. It is to this attitude that Mr. FitzGibbon addresses himself: that the attempted assassination was not something dreamed up on the spur of the moment by a military junto

intent on preserving the *Wehrmacht* for further mischief in a future generation; that the attempted assassination, in fact, represented an act of moral and physical courage of the very highest order; that the attempted assassination was essentially a protest against evil.

But, you say, the attempt failed, Hitler survived and the grim tragedy in Europe played on for the best part of another year while men died and Germany was methodically pounded into a bloody rubble. This attempted assassination, therefore, can only be of interest to dreamers who spend their time contemplating the "might-have-beens" of life.



I cannot agree. Rather, I would say that it is exactly at this point that it becomes most important that we fully understand the story unfolded in *20 July*. Mr. FitzGibbon makes it clear beyond any shadow of a doubt that Count Stauffenberg and his fellows were impelled by motives of morality, not by expediency alone. Their determination to overthrow Hitler was of long-standing, based on a conviction that only by so doing could Germany be saved from further destruction and "to prove to the world that there existed within Germany forces other than those which the nihilists had so long employed for their evil ends." While the desire to save Germany from the beating that was being administered is understandable enough, it is to the second part of their purpose that I would invite your attention.

As Mr. FitzGibbon points out, by early July 1944, with the Allies firmly established ashore in Normandy, some of the plotters themselves—realizing that time was running against them—began to have serious doubts as to the advisability of going ahead with their project. In the first place, should they succeed in eliminating Hitler at this late date they might well "create a new 'stab-in-the-back' legend: the German people might be led to believe that had

Hitler remained his wonder-weapons might yet have won the war." In the second place, should the attempt fail—and the odds were at least 2-1 against by their own calculation—the "massacre of all that was best in Germany would deprive the Germans of those very leaders whom they would need most desperately as soon as the dust of defeat had begun to settle."

Faced with this dilemma, Stauffenberg and his companions came to a decision: "The assassination must be attempted at any cost. Even should it fail, the attempt to seize power in the capitol must be undertaken. We must prove to the world and to future generations that the men of the German resistance movement dared to take the decisive step and to hazard their lives upon it. Compared with this, nothing else matters."

And so they went ahead and failed and suffered horribly before they died. They were brave men and they paid with their lives because they refused to follow the easy line and accept things they knew to be evil. It is not surprising to learn that the majority of the active plotters were devout Christians.

There has been a great deal written about the mistakes that we and our Allies managed to contrive during the fateful days of 1939-45 when we were earnestly engaged in obliterating our enemies. Our insistence on prosecuting the war for military aims, rather than political purposes, is a hallmark of those years. Our naivete on unconditional surrender, our failure to appreciate the meaning of Berlin, the failure to appreciate the significance of Russian troops in Europe—these are but a few examples from a long and dreary list.

Perhaps, as time goes on, it may well come about that our failure to recognize and support the German resistance movement will be classed as one of the colossal blunders of our time. Both we and our Allies were quite aware of what was going on, but we couldn't—or wouldn't—believe the evidence presented. We failed to appreciate the opportunity that lay ready to hand, had we the wit to perceive it and the skill to use it.

If we understand what happened in Germany and the background of the events that culminated in a bomb explosion in East Prussia on 20 July 1944, we can still profit by the experience. I do not think that all Germans are good

—nor that all Germans are evil. I hold no brief for the crimes committed in the name of Germany. But I do say that Stauffenberg and his associates, by their actions, were motivated by the highest ideals of patriotism and morality in the best sense of those often misused words.

I have tried to indicate why I think *20 July* is an important book. I believe that the author, Mr. Constantine FitzGibbon, has succeeded completely in his purpose—he has written a thoroughly engrossing story of one of the most remarkable incidents of our generation.

Reviewed by Col R. McC. Tompkins

Subway Campaign . . .

TWO RUBLES TO TIMES SQUARE—

Guy Richards. 249 pages. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; Boston: Little, Brown, 1956. \$3.50

On the night of Saturday, November 7, ships steaming from Kronstadt on varied courses, rendezvoused off New York and entered the harbor undetected while the seas were being swept by the entire radar system of the northeastern United States and guided missile launching sites were loaded for action and on 24-hour standby alert.

Within a matter of hours the ships had tied up at empty docks in lower Manhattan and from those ships had been landed a Soviet force under the command of Gen Ketov. By dawn the Soviets had taken over the entire southern tip of Manhattan, including all of its 70,000 inhabitants who were held as hostages by the Soviets. During the course of the operation no shot was fired by the invader, and no defensive move made by the Americans—so sudden was the invasion and so complete the surprise.

Moscow denied any knowledge of the aggression, denounced Gen Ketov and his men as renegades and called on them to surrender to United States forces immediately. Washington, including the President, called on the nation to remain calm, and directed that no shot be fired against the enemy until he commenced offensive operations. Ketov issued an ultimatum declaring that the portion of Manhattan held by him was sovereign territory, that persons entering the Soviet perimeter without authority would be shot, and for every such violation 10 additional hostages would be executed. The declaration further stated that life in New York City would continue its usual course, barring the limits imposed upon it by the Soviets, until the aim of the Soviet mission had been made public. The people of the United States were divided in their opinions. Some thought that an immediate counterattack against the Soviets was the answer, while others, more cautious, insisted that the way to victory

over the invaders was by soft talk and kindness and by a display of the superiority of the American way of life as opposed to life within the Iron Curtain. The world watched and waited for the final reaction. General Ketov, secure within his perimeter, did the same.

While the world and Gen Ketov watched and waited, Gen Bill DeWitt, an old line, professional soldier and Commanding General, First Army, was briefed by Washington on his mission as commander of a striking force of combined arms to be used against the Soviets when the word to attack was given. Included in his force was the 82d Abn Div, Naval forces, an armored division and two Marine infantry regiments from the 2d Mar Div. While Ketov toured New York under the guidance of two of his hostages, Ed Fulton, a radio reporter and his girl Julie Helm, Gen DeWitt assembled these forces and chafed for orders to arrive which would throw this potent military force against the enemy and drive them into the sea. The battle for Manhattan is finally joined and from the description of the combat action it is evident that the author has more than a token knowledge of the concepts of modern warfare. Though the Soviet force finally surrenders to the Americans, Ketov disappears into nowhere, carrying with him all the money found by his force in the banks and vaults of Wall Street—leaving the American government as perplexed and unsure of itself as it was the day the Russians appeared.

Two Rubles to Times Square is a story of personalities, of ideas and ideals. Against a background of surprise invasion and mass confusion, the author has drawn in fine detail a picture of



what could and in all probability would happen if such an event took place. The Soviet Gen Ketov; his opposite number in the American forces, General DeWitt; radio reporter Ed Fulton and his girl Julie Helm are the main characters who appear in a narrative which is superb in its pace and in its ability to hold reader interest. Woven into the plot, visible throughout, but not offensively so, is a gentle gibe directed at the attitudes and platitudes of the American government, which hold it indecisive in time of stress and at the naive and al-

most unbelievable complacency of the average American towards an outsider—even when that outsider has the opportunity of taking over the largest city in the United States. So well organized is the material, and so well written the book that the reader can not outguess the author—even in the last chapter—a tribute which can be given to but few writers of fiction these days.

Author Guy Richards is well qualified to write such a story. He is a veteran New York newspaperman as well as being a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. Prior to WWII he made an extensive journey to the South Pacific which turned out to be most profitable in the subsequent campaigns there. During the war he served on the staff of I Marine Amphibious Corps and later with the 5th Marines.

Reviewed by Maj G. P. Averill

East-West Controversy . . .

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR—

Kenneth Ingram. 239 pages, index. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. \$5.00

Great events have moved swiftly across the stage of world history since the end of World War II. During this post-war period there have been few events of world significance that have not been related to Communist expansionism.

Because so much has happened in these matters in the last 10 years, and because so much is continuing to happen from day to day, a book such as this can serve as a means of reviewing in proper chronological sequence the course of the East-West controversy.

Author Ingram traces the development of the post war tension through such events as the *coup d'etat* in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the Korean war and Communist expansion in Asia. In addition, the book includes chapters on such background matters as the use of the veto in the Security Council, the Baruch proposals and Soviet reactions to them, NATO and West German rearmament, and Soviet-Western relations within the United Nations organization.

In a book of such historical scope it is to be expected that some portions will, from a reviewer's standpoint, seem more impressive than other parts of the text. The author seems to have had a much more confident grasp of his problem as he writes of the Czechoslovakian *coup d'etat* and the break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. His account of Communist penetration of the Czechoslovakian government is a detailed study of Communist seizure of a government by means less than overt war. Of particular interest is the section devoted to the tragic role and fate

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of pro-Western Jan Masaryk, who was unable to stem the Red tide that engulfed him and his nation.

With respect to the Yugoslav-Soviet schism, Author Ingram delves deeply into the causes for Tito's defection, pointing up the independent and nationalistic attitude of the many races which comprise the modern Yugoslav state. Such characteristics easily conflicted with the servile status which Stalin accorded the satellite states of Eastern Europe.

The sections devoted to the post-war events in the Far East will probably create both criticism and skepticism on the part of the discerning readers. While the author recognizes Communist threats in Pacific Asia, he fails to relate Red expansion in Asia to over-all Sino-Russian direction. There are many who will strongly dissent from the author's doubts as to the extent that, for instance, Malayan Communist terrorism, as well as North Korea's war policy, were sponsored by Red China or the Soviet Union.

Also, there will be students of Asian affairs who will feel that the author's sharply critical appraisal of Chiang Kai-Shek together with what seems an overly favorable interpretation of the Red Chinese regime, deprives the book of much objectivity.

The book should be of use in helping review events of the past 10 years, but it should not be accepted as the final, authoritative, text on the past-war East-West conflict.

Reviewed by Col J. D. Hittle

Problems of Great Magnitude . . .
MEMOIRS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN:
VOL. I, YEAR OF DECISIONS—
Harry S. Truman. 561 pages. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955.

To those who admire former President Harry Truman and his administration of the Federal government, this account of his first year in the White House will be viewed as a true reflection of his greatness. To some it will confirm their views of his ineptness and failure as a President.

His purpose in writing his *Memoirs* is, according to the preface, to record for posterity the facts and circumstances which impelled him to make the many decisions necessary following the death of President Roosevelt. For his contemporaries it is a matter of "informing some people and in setting others straight on the facts." Following advance publication in *Life* magazine and *The New York Times*, several former associates have taken violent exception to Mr. Truman's "facts."

Mr. Truman writes with apparent candor and accuracy. However, since he has at times demonstrated mortal weaknesses, one is struck by the 100 per cent infallibility recorded in *Year of Decisions*. The impression gained from reading the book reminds one of the reply of the Southern guide who, while pointing out the location of many Confederate victories at the Vicksburg battlefield, was asked by the lady from Boston if the Northern forces hadn't won some victories in the vicinity. "No," replied the guide, "and there will be none, so long as I'm telling the story."

In the early chapters Mr. Truman describes the many problems which immediately confronted him upon being given the oath of office by Chief Justice Stone. The humility which he demonstrated at the time these events occurred does not find its way into his book. It has been replaced by an attitude of self-confidence and unhesitating decisions.

After launching into the early days of his Presidency, Mr. Truman digresses for several chapters and recounts the story of his life. Here the reader is led along the unpretentious trail which, for young Harry Truman, led to the White House—early life on a Missouri farm, a consuming interest in history, work in a drug store, bank clerk, member of the National Guard, Mason, battery commander in France, clothing store owner

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in Kansas City, business failure, county judge, Senator, Chairman of the Senate Committee investigating the national defense program, and finally Vice President. Ambition, industry and hard work were characteristic traits throughout his years preceding the Presidency. When appointed to head the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program he applied himself with characteristic vigor. While the usefulness of the Committee's work cannot be belittled, the magnitude of its accomplishment appears exaggerated. For example, the reader is told that one result of the Committee's work was "a stepped-up offensive which wiped out the German submarine domination of the shipping lanes"; and that "When the Committee analyzed the rubber problem . . . the way was made clear for intelligent action by the government."

Mr. Truman's book is documented throughout with diplomatic messages and conversations which he carried on with other heads of state. Thus, while the book reveals no secrets or vital information which has not previously been published, it does provide a valuable source for historic documents of the era. These are inserted in their chronological order and can be found alongside items of much less significance such as personal notes to his mother and sister. While the book contains everything but the kitchen sink, it is not easy to read or particularly entertaining. The style is plodding and factual and the reader is presented with the press release type decision of the President, rather than with the more interesting, and perhaps more informative, story behind the news.

For those seeking the Commander-in-Chief's views of subordinate commanders, the book is not revealing. There is only a limited discussion of civilian versus military control of the military establishment. It is apparent that Mr. Truman was well satisfied with his military advisors. Perhaps too much so — when it is considered that it was they who insisted that Russia be brought into the war with Japan, and who, in those fateful days of 1945, laid the foundation for subsequent American attitudes and policies toward Nationalist China.

When historians evaluate the Presidency of Harry S. Truman they will have to take his *Memoirs* into account, not so much for the facts presented, but rather for the picture it gives of a man of action and strong convictions who was in 1945 forced to cope with immediate problems of the greatest magnitude.

Reviewed by LtCol J. F. Lawrence

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1—Essays must not exceed 5,000 words.

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3—The name of the competitor shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay, in addition to the article. This phrase shall appear:

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4—Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a large, sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Va.

5—Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1956.

CONTESTANTS WHO ENTER THE Marine Corps Association's 1956 Prize Essay Contest may write on any military subject of general interest.

However, it should be pointed out that an essay must be original and should be analytical or interpretive. Material dealing with any facet of a new concept of warfare on ground or air operations or tactics is particularly desired. Historical monographs are *not* solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

This is the first contest sponsored by the Association since 1954. Grand Prize winner in the '54 contest was SSgt Richard Fortner of Parris Island. Other prizes were awarded to Col Robert Cushman, Jr. and Capt Robert Piehl with Sgt Henry I. Shaw receiving an honorable mention.

In addition to the prize-winning articles, the Editorial Board recommended and approved purchase of a number of other articles submitted in the contest. Authors of articles so selected were paid at rates ranging up to 6 cents a word. As a matter of statistics, it might be of interest to mention that one of every three entries in the 1954 contest was purchased.

Just as in 1954, essays will be considered in 3 groups determined by the status of the author as an active, inactive, or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies, or as a civilian. A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group.

As mentioned previously, in addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention," and even those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for publication. The authors of such essays will be compensated as may be adjudged by the Editorial Board.

Previously, while the Board was sitting in judgment, many inquiries were made by contestants as to the status of their articles. It is impossible to answer these inquiries because the envelopes containing the authors' identification are not opened until final judgment is made and the articles have been cleared for security. Awards are made by ballot without knowledge of the names of competitors. Therefore, inquiries will not be answered until final judgment has been made.

If, in the opinion of the Board, no essay entered in the contest is of sufficiently high standard of excellence, it is empowered to not award a prize in the class or classes concerned. Awards may be split among 2 or more of the entrants.

The results of the contest will be announced in the GAZETTE as soon as possible after the deadline of 1 October 1956 and the winning essays will be published as soon thereafter as practicable.

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It is a pleasure to extend both a hearty "well done" and my personal best wishes to all Marines on this anniversary of Marine Aviation.

B. L. Schilt

Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps for Air

